

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1366648-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 25

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FOI/PA# 1213375-0

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: 9/7/71

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

cc Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Brennan
Mr. D.E. Moore
Mr. Branigan

SUBJECT: OLEG A. LYALIN
KGB Agent, London, England

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gale _____
Ponder _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Last night [redacted] called me to advise he had an urgent matter to discuss which he preferred not wait until this morning. I met him at the office.

He advised that the above-captioned person, who has been assigned to the Soviet Embassy in London, has defected to the British. [redacted] said that this particular KGB agent was a member of the 13th Directorate, which is the Directorate which reportedly has responsibility for engaging in sabotage and assassinations. [redacted] stated that, to his knowledge, this is the first time a Soviet has defected from this particular Directorate.

Oleg A. Lyalin came out of the Soviet establishment in London 9/3/71 and the British have been interrogating him ever since. [redacted] furnished me with a brief document relating to some possible leads and cases in this country, and this has been referred to the Domestic Intelligence Division for action.

[redacted] said that undoubtedly more material will be coming from this defector which will be of interest to us, and he will furnish it promptly.

A review of Bureau indices failed to reflect anything of importance on the subject. It did show that on 3/22/71 a photograph of the subject was shown to [redacted] who did not identify him. It will be recalled that [redacted] defected from the Soviets some years ago and has been under the direction of [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION -

For the information of the Director.

WCS:CSH (5)

61 SEP 27 1971

REC-55 105-216642

EX-103

22 SEP 8 1971

MCT 37

ESPIONAGE

~~SECRET~~ (U)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

Viper
Tolson _____
Felt _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gale _____
Ponder _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____ b6
Holmes _____ b7C
Gandy _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Branigan _____

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 9/10/71

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. J. P. Lee
1 - [redacted]

SUBJECT: OLEG A. LYALIN
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

This is to furnish results of analysis of initial information concerning Soviet intelligence operations in the U.S., which information was obtained by [redacted] from Lyalin, a Soviet who defected on 9/3/71, while on assignment in England. b7D

[redacted] advised that Lyalin, an officer of the Committee for State Security (KGB), 13th Department (Sabotage and Assassination) had learned from a subordinate Soviet intelligence officer, formerly responsible for supervision of some Soviet intelligence operations in the U.S., of three operations in this country. Lyalin has furnished only fragmentary information concerning these operations. b1 b3

(S)

(S)

The third operation involves an Armenian in the U.S. who has been recruited by the Soviets. Lyalin's information on this individual is too fragmentary for identification, but this matter will be closely followed with [redacted] 105-216642-2 b7D

JEN:aeb
(6) *aeb*

RECEIVED-101 CONTINUED - OVER

SEP 15 1971

SEP 13 11 07 AM '71

EX-103

54 SEP 21 1971

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1)
DATE 06-17-2015

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Oleg A. Lyalin

As Lyalin's knowledge of these cases was obtained through conversations with his subordinate, there is no reason to believe that the Soviets will become aware they have been compromised by his defection.

Our analysis shows that both of the operations about which Lyalin furnished sufficient information for identification were operations long under the full control of this Bureau.

ACTION:

None. For information.

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WOB

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~~WOB~~

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1 - Mr. Lee


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SAC, WFO (105-52159)

9/10/71

b6
b7C

Director, FBI (105-117821)



On 9/6/71 Washington Liaison Representative of [redacted] advised Bureau official that Oleg A. Lyalin, assigned Soviet Embassy in London, had defected and that British had been interrogating him since 9/3/71. He was described as member of 13th Directorate of KGB.

Preliminary summary of information furnished which would be of interest to Bureau was made available together with statement that Lyalin desired to remain in the United Kingdom and would be available for any questioning desired by Bureau.

[redacted] advised that Lyalin said that while subject was in U. S. in 1963-69 he had an agent offering him information about special classified cars. cursory review of Bufiles failed to develop any information which might be identifiable with these circumstances.

Promptly review your files concerning subject. If you desire further questioning of Lyalin by [redacted] prepare subject matter in conformance with instructions in FBI Handbook, page 50b, for referral to [redacted] through Legat, London. A copy of any such submissions should be designated for Bureau file on Lyalin in classification 65 which is being opened on this communication.

Additional information furnished by Lyalin will be made available to recipient offices by separate communication.

1 - New York (105-59973)

① - 65-new (Oleg A. Lyalin)

ECP:eco (8)

NOTE: See memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson, dated 9/7/71, captioned "Oleg A. Lyalin, KGB Agent, London, England," prepared by WCS:CSH

105-216642
NOT RECORDED
87 SEP 14 1971

DUPLICATE YELLOW

50 SEP 20 1971

b6
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ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-117821-101

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, New York

9/22/71

Director, FBI

(PERSONAL ATTENTION)

1 - Mr. Lee

OLEG A. LYALIN
IS - R

There is attached for each office one copy each of three memoranda furnished to the Bureau by the Washington representative of [redacted]. The first memorandum received on 9/6/71 sets forth scanty information with each item being given an alphabetical designation. The other two memoranda were furnished to the Bureau on 9/14/71. Boston is referred to Butel 9/14/71 in the case entitled [redacted]. San Francisco is referred to airtel captioned [redacted] dated 9/15/71 and WFO and New York are referred to Bulet to WFO 9/10/71 captioned [redacted].

New York is referred to the information relating to Nikolay Alekseyevich Kuznetsov in one of the attached memoranda. New York should refer to its file on Kuznetsov for any information which might be of assistance to the British in either confirming or negating the information which has been furnished by Lyalin. This should be furnished in form suitable for dissemination in the Kuznetsov file with a copy designated for this file.

For the information of all offices, Boston has developed the fact that one [redacted] India, [redacted] Massachusetts, [redacted] Massachusetts, 1/3/45. [redacted] Quincy Junior College, Quincy, Massachusetts, and it is anticipated he will be interviewed in the near future.

San Francisco has been instructed to initiate investigation to identify [redacted].

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Cleveland _____
Ponder _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Enclosures - 3

- 1 - Boston (Enclosures - 3) (PERSONAL ATTENTION)
- 1 - San Francisco (Enclosures - 3) (PERSONAL ATTENTION)
- 1 - London (Enclosures - 3) (PERSONAL ATTENTION)
- 1 - WFO (Enclosures - 3) (PERSONAL ATTENTION)
- 1 - Foreign Liaison Desk

JPL:tdp (9)

MAILED 17
SEP 21 1971

105-216642-3

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

67 SEP 27 1971

Letter to SAC, New York
RE: OLEG A. LYALIN

With regard to the member of the U. S. Navy and the member of the U. S. Army allegedly recruited by the Soviets abroad, this is being handled by [] in conjunction with representatives of the Army and Navy since both of these persons are outside the U. S.

b7E

With regard to [] as set out in the attached memorandum [] has advised that it has learned that his contacts with the Soviets were made with the full knowledge of [] and the State Department, and this matter is being handled by those agencies.

b6
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b7E

For your additional information [] has advised that Lyalin originally approached that agency in 4/71 and reported that he was having matrimonial problems and was not progressing as well as he wanted in the KGB. He proposed furnishing information if the British would have him declared persona non grata. He claimed such action would bring him praise from the KGB and would also permit him to return to Russia where he would institute divorce proceedings against his wife. The situation changed, however, and Lyalin was not declared persona non grata but was operated in place until 9/1/71 when he was arrested by the police for drunken driving. In addition, on 9/2/71 a KGB friend of his wrote to him from Moscow and sent the letter to the Soviet Embassy, London, using Lyalin's KGB cover name. The letter was misdirected and reached the Chief of the KGB Residency in London who noted that the writer told Lyalin that he had been in contact with his wife and she had reported that Lyalin was unhappy in London and also was dissatisfied with his work in the KGB.

b7D

The Chief of the KGB Residency informed Lyalin that these statements were such as to necessitate his (Lyalin's) return to Moscow and he instructed Lyalin to proceed to the Soviet Trade Delegation where he worked and clear up his work and leave for Moscow the same night. Lyalin was permitted to leave the Soviet Embassy to travel the four miles to his place of employment without any escort and he took advantage of this to contact [] and arrange for his defection. He also contacted his current girl friend, Irina Georgiyevna Teplakova, wife of a Soviet delegate to the International Wheat Delegation and invited her to defect with him which she agreed to do. The [] representative in Washington has advised that the information which has been developed so far appears to indicate that Lyalin is a

b7D

Letter to SAC, New York
RE: OLEG A. LYALIN

bona fide defector. However, [] is currently handling the immediate operational problems and will further interrogate Lyalin in depth when time permits.

b7D

Additional pertinent information will be furnished as received from []. In addition, [] has offered to service any requests we may have for questioning Lyalin. Each office should consider this offer and submit any questions it feels should be submitted to Lyalin concerning the information he has already furnished or any information he may have which would be of interest to the Bureau.

b7D

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *esm*

1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. E.S. Miller

FROM : W. A. Branigan *WAB*

DATE: September 14, 1971

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 -
1 - Mr. J.P. Lee

SUBJECT: OLEG A. LYALIN
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Belmont, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gale _____
Ponder _____
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Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Mc Clellan _____

This reports additional information furnished by concerning Soviet intelligence operations as obtained from the subject, a Soviet KGB (Committee for State Security) agent who defected in England 9/3/71.

 furnished the following additional information to SA J. P. Lee on 9/14/71 developed from Lyalin. He advised that Lyalin approached in 4/71 and stated he was having matrimonial problems and was not progressing as well as he wanted in the KGB. He proposed furnishing information if the British would have him declared persona non grata. He claimed this would bring him praise from the KGB and would permit him to return to Russia to divorce his wife. The situation changed, however, and he was operated in place until 9/1 when he was arrested by the police for drunken driving. Also, on 9/2 a KGB friend of his wrote him from Moscow and sent the letter to the Soviet Embassy, London, using Lyalin's cover name. The letter was misdirected and reached the Chief of the KGB Residency who noted that the writer said he had contacted Lyalin's wife and she reported that Lyalin was unhappy in London and in the KGB.

The Chief of the Residency told Lyalin that these statements necessitated his return to Moscow and instructed him to proceed to the Soviet Trade Delegation where Lyalin worked to clear up his work and leave for Moscow that night. Lyalin left the Soviet Embassy to travel the four miles to his place of employment without any escort and he contacted and arranged for his defection. He also contacted his current girl friend, Irina Georgiyevna Teplakova, wife of a Soviet delegate to the International Wheat Delegation and she agreed to defect with him.

U.S. advised no publicity has been given to the defect as yet although they have arrested one individual who was caught in the act of receiving messages from Russia. He is believed to be a Cypriot working for the Soviets. advised that so far the information developed appears to indicate that Lyalin is a bona fide defector.

CONTINUED - OVER SEP 22 1971

JPL:tdp
(6)

67 SEP 27 1971

Memorandum to Mr. E.S. Miller
RE: OLEG A. LYALIN

[redacted] also advised that Lyalin furnished information about one [redacted] Bremem, Germany, and Latvia, [redacted] the U. S. Navy [redacted] between Germany and Vietnam. He also mentioned a major in the U. S. Army recruited by the Soviets two years ago in Norway who is currently in West Germany. [redacted] has advised this information has been made available to the Army and the Navy and investigation is under way to identify these individuals. [redacted]

Lyalin also named [redacted] American [redacted] currently in London who was being assessed by [redacted] of the KGB. [redacted] San Francisco people who sent him abroad to avoid the draft. The Chief Resident of the KGB was skeptical about [redacted] interest in [redacted] and as a result [redacted] interest in him has lapsed. We are instructing San Francisco to identify [redacted] since Bufiles are negative. [redacted]

Lyalin also mentioned one [redacted] of the U. S. Embassy in London who has been in contact with [redacted] has advised that both State Department and [redacted] are aware of [redacted] contacts with the Russians and such contacts are not for intelligence purposes. [redacted]

Lyalin also mentioned one [redacted] Shell Oil Corporation in London and furnished information to the KGB which he obtained at Shell. [redacted]

[redacted] Boston Office has been instructed to identify and develop background information about the activities of this couple in order that consideration may be given to interviewing them. [redacted]

[redacted] is extremely anxious to obtain whatever information is possible which would assist them in determining whether Lyalin is a bona fide defector, and he requested that any information developed be furnished to [redacted] through him. He stated the same request was made of [redacted] will channel information through him to [redacted] in London.

ACTION:

This matter is being followed closely in order that we can develop complete information concerning any Americans involved.

STATESS

3:15 PM IMMEDIATE 9/24/71 CM

TO DIRECTOR IR 133-24

FROM LONDON 2P

OLEG ADOLFOVICH OLYAZIN

SOVIET DIPLOMATIC AND ANCILLARY ESTABLISHMENTS, LONDON, ENGLAND.

INFORMATION CONCERNING. NILEV.

ADVISED AS

FOLLOWS AT 2:15 PM SEPTEMBER TWO FOUR INSTANT:

AT 3:15 PM SEPTEMBER TWO FOUR INSTANT

[REDACTED] WILL MEET WITH THE SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, SOVIET EMBASSY, LONDON, AND TELL HIM THAT WITHIN TWO WEEKS NINETY ONE SOVIET OFFICIALS MUST LEAVE ENGLAND. FORTY THREE OF THEM WILL BE DIPLOMATIC OFFICIALS, FOURTEEN SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIALS, TWENTY EIGHT FROM THE SOVIET TRADE DELEGATION AND SIX FROM ANCILLARY ESTABLISHMENTS SUCH AS AEROFLOT, INTOURIST, ETC. NONE OF THEM WILL BE TASS OR PRESS OFFICIALS. ADDITIONALLY THE CHARGE WILL BE TOLD THAT ANY SOVIET OFFICIALS POSSESSING VALID RE-ENTRY VISAS TO THE U. K. WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO RETURN.

CHARGE WILL BE TOLD THAT IN THE FUTURE EVERY TIME A MEMBER OF ANY SOVIET ESTABLISHMENT IS CAUGHT IN ACTIVITIES DETRIMENTAL TO THE SECURITY OF U. K. HE WILL BE DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA AND HE WILL NOT BE REPLACED.

END PAGE ONE

ENCLOSURE

NOT RECORDED

150 SEP 29 1971

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ORIGINALS FILED IN 64-211-241-

PAGE TWO NR 183-24

AFTER THE NINETY ONE OFFICIALS LEAVE, THE SOVIET EMBASSY PERSONNEL WILL BE FROZEN AS WILL PERSONNEL AT OTHER ESTABLISHMENTS, WHICH MEANS THAT THEY WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO BEEF UP ONE OR THE OTHER IN THE FUTURE.

IN ANTICIPATION OF POSSIBLE SAVAGE REACTION BY MOSCOW, THE CHARGE WILL BE TOLD THAT IF THERE IS SUCH A REACTION IN AN EFFORT TO SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE BRITISH EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN MOSCOW THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS THE CAPABILITY OF TAKING OTHER ACTIONS BASED IN INFORMATION MADE AVAILABLE TO THEM BY A KGB DEFECTOR.

ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] THIS ACTION HAS BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR SOME TIME BUT FOR VARIOUS REASONS COULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT.

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THE BFO (BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE) PLANS TO HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE AT FOUR PM SEPTEMBER TWO FOUR INSTANT TO RELEASE INFO PERTAINING TO THE FOREGOING ACTION BEING TAKEN.

[REDACTED] ADVISED THAT [REDACTED] REPRESENTATIVE IN WASHINGTON HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ADVISE YOU AND HELMS OF [REDACTED] AT THE SAME TIME REGARDING ACTION TO BE TAKEN. THIS CABLE IS CONFIRMATORY TO YOU.

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b7E

END

RECEIVED: 11-44AM DRL

cc: MR. MILLER

END CC: MR. DAK

5-113a (9-29-65)

Domestic Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 9/24/71

Cable confirms information previously furnished to Director by representative regarding persona non grata action by British against 91 Soviet officials.

If you approve, this will be furnished to Mr. Kissinger at the White House, with exception of administrative data in final paragraph, *BY TELETYPE. ALSO COPY WILL BE SENT ATTORNEY GENERAL.*

LW:chs

While this is now on the radio it is believed we should disseminate to show we have the channels which apprise us of such matters.

Yes
h

WLB

h

SEP 24 1971
WLB

105-216642-

ENCLOSURE

b7D

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 17 1971

TELETYPE

STATE 324

URGENT 9-17-71

TO DIRECTOR NR 179

FROM LEGAT LONDON

TRANSMITTED IN CODE
PARAPHRASE IF DISSEMINATED

OLEG ADOLFOVICH LYALIN; ET AL, ESP-R. HILEV?

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Bishop _____
Mr. Miller, ES _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Casper _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Dalbey _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Ponder _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Walters _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

RELONCAB SEPTEMBER NINE LAST.

[REDACTED] ON SEPTEMBER SEVENTEEN ADVISED TWO ADDITIONAL NAMES
FURNISHED BY SOURCE. THEY ARE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] BOTH ARE CURRENTLY BEING INTERROGATED BY [REDACTED]

GOVERNMENT [REDACTED]

BRITISH

[REDACTED] HAS FURNISHED STATEMENT [REDACTED]

BY KGB [REDACTED]

KGB

END PAGE ONE

SEP 24 1971

RECEIVED TO: 971

F73

XEROX

SEP 1971

ESPIONAGE

PAGE TWO



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THE OTHER INDIVIDUAL IS CURRENTLY BEING INTERROGATED AND AS
OF FIVE PM SEPTEMBER SEVENTEEN NO ADMISSIONS AS YET MADE. FURTHER
DATA WILL BE FURNISHED WHEN RECEIVED. COORDINATED.

RECEIVED 452P PLB

3RD CC:



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b7C

~~TOP SECRET~~

1. Sub division I of 13th Dept KGB (now known as Dept V) deals with North and South America. [redacted]

[redacted] Sub division are:-

[redacted] K.G.B.

(a) [redacted]

[redacted] without any experience. [redacted]

RUSSIA

He was earmarked for Mexico: he may already be there.

2. Until October/November 1969, the head of Dept. V. in the USA was Nikolay Alekseyevich KUZNETSOV who was in the U.N. in New York. This was his second posting in the U.S. On the first, he recruited a RUSSIA technician connected with electronics and computers for which he received a very high decoration. He was not liked in headquarters because he was always emphasising his superior position and the fact that he had been decorated. During his second posting in the U.S., he produced no MEMBER-K.G.B. practical results and after encountering some "difficulties" was obliged to return unexpectedly to Russia in October or November 1969 leaving all his possessions behind. LYALIN believes that he is now teaching. The present head of Dept V. in the U.S. is believed by LYALIN to be [redacted] under U.N. cover in New York.

OLEG A.

3. There are currently two young Dept. V. officers in Washington: they had previously been subordinate to KUZNETSOV. [redacted] prior to going to the U.S. later this year: he will serve under U.N. cover in New York. RUSSIA MEMBER-K.G.B.

4. There is a Dept V. officer in Colombia: he went there in late 1969/early 1970. LYALIN does not know if there is a Dept. V. representative in Canada. In November 1968 there was someone training to be a member of the Consular staff for Canada. This man might therefore be in Canada.

~~ENCLOSURE~~

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

8th September, 1971.

SEP 14 1971

EX-102

REC-35

1 SEP 27 1971

~~TOP SECRET~~

SEP 28 1971

54 OCT 4 1971

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DEFECTION OF K.G.B. OFFICER

On 3rd September, 1971, Oleg Adolfovich LYALIN, a *new* 6
thirty-four year old officer of the Soviet Committee for
State Security (K.G.B.) defected to the Security Service.
OLEG A. LYALIN
He had been en poste in London since April, 1969, under
Soviet Trade Delegation cover as the representative of the
RAZNO EXPORT AGENCY mainly concerned with knitwear.

2. LYALIN served in Department V. (formerly known as
the 13th Department) of the K.G.B. which is charged
primarily with the planning and preparation of sabotage
operations that would be mounted in periods of great
tension and in wartime. According to LYALIN, Department V.
has been represented in London since 1960 and in recent
years there have been two Department V. officers en poste.
LYALIN was the senior of these two officers and because
the work is highly secret and specialised, he reported
direct to the head K.G.B. legal resident.

3. In his intelligence role, LYALIN's task was to make
contingency plans for sabotage against military, political
and economic targets in the United Kingdom. Although
according to LYALIN specific targets have not yet been
allocated as between the K.G.B. and the Chief Intelligence
Directorate (G.R.U.) and LYALIN had not been given

his/

54 OCT 4

1971 145

MCT-63

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given/

his own targets, he expected that K.G.B. targets would include public utilities, the railways, Government and military communications, Government offices and shelters, the Civil Defence organisation and emergency food supplies.

4. LYALIN was in the process of selecting and reporting on sites to be used for the infiltration by air and sea of Soviet sabotage groups into the U.K. during the period of crisis preceding the outbreak of conventional war. He had submitted a comprehensive plan for the seaborne landing of a group (or groups) on the North Yorkshire coast and consideration was being given to the selection of a dropping zone for an airborne landing north of the Caledonian Canal. He was also building up a group of U.K. domiciled agents. The group which had already been equipped with a radio, was, when the time came, to have provided LYALIN with a self-contained operational base and to have been used to prepare for and subsequently to support the arrival and operations of the Soviet sabotage groups.

5. From what LYALIN has said, there can be little doubt that whilst taking account of the risks of attribution and escalation, the Department V. are making dispositions to commence sabotage operations in the U.K. in a period of possibly prolonged crisis, leading up to the outbreak of war. During such a period, a variety of sabotage

measures/

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- 3 -

sabotage/

measures would be taken, including in their objectives the demoralisation of the civilian population and the complete disruption of the political and economic life of the country.

6. According to LYALIN, the K.G.B. has not engaged in industrial sabotage in the U.K. in peacetime. However, on one occasion a proposal was submitted to headquarters for an operation to contaminate Holy Loch with radio active material with a view to implicating U.S. Naval forces. Every Department V. operation during peacetime requires the approval of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and approval was not given in this instance.

7. In addition to his Department V. work, he gave support to his K.G.B. colleagues in their agent running operations.

8. There is so far no reason to doubt the reliability of LYALIN as a source and the accuracy of the information provided by him.

16th September, 1971.

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~~SECRET~~

Three 13th Dept. (now known as Dept. V) agents in the U.S.
about whom LYALIN learnt from [redacted]

[redacted] U.K. who up to 1969/1970
was in the North and South American subdivision of Dept.
V Headquarters:-

(S)

- b) An Armenian, now an American citizen living in
the U.S. He left Armenia many years ago but
still has relatives in Russia. He writes to
his relatives not to officials and he uses an
ancient Armenian language which is difficult
to translate as it is not spoken today.

Note:- All three agents mentioned above are American citi-
zens with American passports; they used their own identities.
All three were current cases in 1969/70. [redacted] was not
directly involved in them but heard about them as a result
of sharing a room.

2. [redacted] has a contact in London who has Communist sympathies. ENG.
The contact shares a flat with a young American [redacted]

[redacted] they advised him to travel to Europe to avoid the
draft. Recently [redacted] has been holidaying in Morocco. In
the U.K. he does occasional jobs to make a living. In places
where he works, he tries to cause trouble, inciting strikes
etc. Initially, [redacted] was cultivating his contact with
a view to finding out as much as possible about [redacted], and
he met [redacted] twice. The Resident was sceptical about

[redacted] interest in [redacted] raised but he continues to pay attention
to the [redacted] was unable to say if there
is a homosexual aspect to this case.

1 SEP 27 1971

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105-216642-8

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DATE 06-19-2015
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When [redacted] was in Norway two years ago (sic) he recruited a major in the U.S. Army. The major was connected with building and construction techniques. [redacted] was subsequently posted to West Germany where he continued to be met by someone else. It appears that [redacted] was on friendly terms with a bookshop owner and he found the American's name on a mailing list for books. He asked the bookshop owner about the major, contrived a meeting in the shop and subsequently recruited him. LYALIN was unable to supply any further information about this major or the [redacted]

4. In 1964, the First Chief Directorate KGB received a document issued by the "American Security Service" for its officers on "What kind of behaviour must be shown towards Russian refugees and refugees from Slavonic countries". LYALIN does not know if this document originated from the U.S. or from the U.S. zone of Germany. It was distributed to all places where there were Russians who travelled abroad e.g. seaports. LYALIN saw a partial translation of it when it reached KLAYPEDA in 1965. The main points that he recalled were:-

- a) how to criticize the Russian way of life;
- b) what you may tell a Russian;
- c) how to treat a Russian refugee or escapee.

5. [redacted]

VENTSPILS and KLAYPEDA, has been a KGB agent since 1963 working to one of LYALIN's former colleagues in KLAYPEDA. [redacted] has a relative, probably a cousin, whose husband is in the U.S. Navy working on military transports between HANGENHAFEN (sic) and Vietnam. [redacted] met this American in Germany and obtained from him information about security measures on board ship, cargoes, loading techniques and timetables of his transport which his controller considered very useful. LYALIN could not recall from which port the transport sailed but he thought that it could have been a small place in North Germany.

6. When [redacted] [redacted]

Counterintelligence Section in the KGB Residency in London, was in the U.S.A., (1963-1969) he had an agent offering him information about special classified cars.

RUSSIA
ENG.
U.S.A.

7. [redacted]

In July 1971, an urgent report was received by the KGB Residency in London instructing all Political Section officers to concentrate on obtaining information on Sino American relations. [redacted] informed LYALIN that he [redacted] London, a Jew [redacted] from whom he [redacted] to seek information. This American official had apparently been offered the post of "second man" in Singapore but he refused. He told [redacted] that he was either going to be an Ambassador in a very big

ENG.

U.S.A.

TOP SECRET

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country or somewhere else but that he is not going to be a Secretary somewhere especially in a place like Singapore.

8.

[redacted] has a non Soviet contact, possibly an American who returned to London from Geneva on 22nd July 1971. [redacted] is particularly interested in this person because [redacted] works in the U.S. Embassy London. [redacted] has not yet met the girl in the U.S. Embassy.

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BOSTON, MASS.

ENG.

9.

[redacted] was until Nov/Dec 1970 [redacted] was in touch with [redacted]

[redacted] who was in London from 1965 to 1969. They met originally by chance in a cafe.

[redacted] and he passed him technical reports "to help him". Before [redacted]

RUSSIA
ENG.

was handed over to LYALIN with instructions to complete his recruitment and bring him under proper control. LYALIN accomplished this in the first two months. [redacted] provided a large volume of confidential reports from SHELL about the oil industry, e.g. research, developments, production, profits, plans, quarterly progress reports on the Stanley Research Centre etc. The material was normally collected from him on Friday and returned to him on Saturday so that he could replace it on Monday.

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[redacted] motive was mercenary and LYALIN paid him £40 for one year. He signed receipts in the name of [redacted]

[redacted] information which from an industrial point of view was considered very good was primarily of interest to the Scientific and Technical Section who were prepared to pay £200 for a complete set of Stanley Research Centre reports. In the second half of 1970 [redacted] was introduced to [redacted]

ENG.

[redacted] of the Scientific and Technical Section but he did not care for [redacted] and he left for the U.S. at the end of 1970, without telling [redacted]

RUSSIA

LYALIN does not know of any attempts to re-establish contact with [redacted] in the U.S. In LYALIN's view it would probably be necessary to see from [redacted] employment whether there would be any advantage in recontacting him and if so who, e.g. [redacted] LYALIN himself would be available to make the contact. LYALIN had received a request from Moscow for [redacted] current address. He had intended to establish the address from another of his agents who is in touch with [redacted]

of R.G.B.

10.

[redacted] Whilst in the U.K. she appears to have been [redacted] Jesuit Missions at 14 Park Street Near Park Lane, W.1. (Tel No. 493-7811) [redacted] went to BOSTON to live with the wife's parents, but the last that LYALIN heard was that they were looking for a flat.

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8th September, 1971.

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ENG. MASS.
BOSTON

~~SECRET~~

(U)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: OLEG A. LYALIN
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. E.S. Miller

DATE: September 27, 1971

1 - Mr. W.A. Branigan
1 - Mr. J.P. Lee

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Cleveland _____
Ponder _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

This memorandum summarizes pertinent information furnished by Oleg A. Lyalin, Committee for State Security (KGB) agent who defected in England 9/3/71 and whose revelations have caused the British Government to declare 105 Soviet nationals persona non grata.

Washington, D. C., has furnished information received from Lyalin since his defection on 9/3/71 pertaining to this country. We reported on three American cases.

The third case involves an Armenian in the U. S. but the information is so fragmentary no identification can be made.

He also told of an American girl, who furnished confidential reports from the Shell Oil Company strictly for money. Lyalin said he left England in late 1970 and was believed to be in Massachusetts. We have located him and the Boston Office has been authorized to conduct an interview promptly.

Lyalin also mentioned one an American living in London who had been under scrutiny by the KGB for possible development.

who sent him to Europe to avoid the draft. San Francisco has been instructed to identify

In addition, Lyalin reported on an unidentified KGB illegal husband and wife team who arrived in London in mid-1969.

105-216642
JPL:tdp (5)

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AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1)
DATE 06-17-2015
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(U)

Memorandum to Mr. E.S. Miller
RE: OLEG A. LYALIN
105-216642

EP9

[redacted] and [redacted]
[redacted] who claimed [redacted] Massachusetts.
The New York and Boston Offices have been instructed to develop complete background information on these individuals promptly.

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ACTION:

In accordance with the Director's instructions, we will maintain close contact with [redacted] to obtain full details concerning the Lyalin disclosures and keep the Director informed of all developments.

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✓ per WBS
WBS
Keep right on top of this.
H
OK
And
DEM
OK

Boston followed

[redacted] on

9/30/71
Info re [redacted] on
furnished [redacted]
10/1 + [redacted] instructed
to conduct further
investigation

OK

10/1/71

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(U)

Sac, New York
SEP 21 1971

ST
file
SUBJECT: OLEG A. LYALIN
CHARACTER: IS - R
BUFILE: 105-New
NYFILE: 105-New
WFOFILE:

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

b7D

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE
SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
~~GROUP 1~~

The Bureau advised on 9/10/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

b7D

New York



1 - 105-65761 (SOV NEVER
ASSIGNED US)

1 - [REDACTED]
1 - New York

Bureau

2 - 105-109535
2 - 105-120709
2 - 105-105-157656
2 - 105-156058

[REDACTED]
2 - 105-182019
2 - 105-97460
2 - 105-22237
2 - 105-94406
2 - 105-99311
2 - 105-131411
2 - 105-40818
2 - 105-186630
2 - 105-133949

2 - 105-New

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105-216642-
NOT RECORDED

10 SEP 24 1971

Don't forget to send to [REDACTED] 10/29/71
OCT 4 1971 105-216642

5/10/71

NY 105-New

[REDACTED]

Source learned that on Monday, 9/6/71, a communication was received by the NY KGB Residency from Headquarters, Moscow, concerning a Soviet defection in London, England, of a KGB officer assigned to "V" Department (Sabotage, Assassination, etc) of the London KGB Residency. The defector was identified as one LYALIN, first name not recalled by the source. According to the source, the communication indicated that the defection occurred during the preceeding weekend (9/4/71) and apparently was to [REDACTED]

b7D


Background furnished regarding LYALIN indicated he (LYALIN) had been employed in the London Residency since 1969. Prior to that time, he had served in the "S" Directorate (Illegal Support) during the period of 1960-69. Source learned that the communication further indicated that LYALIN defected with the wife of an operational KGB worker assigned to the London Residency, identity of whom was not disclosed.

According to the source, the above information was not publicized generally within the KGB Residency but facts relative to the defection were made known to the various Branch "Chiefs." Thereafter, KGB officers within each Branch were questioned concerning the possibility of LYALIN's knowledge of their KGB affiliation. According to the source, the basis for this questioning was not disclosed to the KGB officers.

Further, source learned through [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] knew
of LYALIN and were possibly known to him (LYALIN):

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NY 105-New



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Source also learned that some other KGB officers within the NY Residency were also mentioned as possibly being known to LYALIN, but these individuals were not identified.

Source further learned that [redacted]

[redacted] is also known to LYALIN.

In addition, source learned through [redacted] that LYALIN can identify some agents of [redacted] in the London Residency and also knows some details concerning [redacted] operations in London.

According to the source, [redacted]

[redacted] cannot be sure whether LYALIN is in a position to identify him [redacted]

[redacted] who served in London with LYALIN may have mentioned [redacted] as having been [redacted]

[redacted] in the London Residency. [redacted] feels that LYALIN undoubtedly knew his [redacted] successor in London as [redacted]

NY 105-New

Source learned that, concerning the reaction of KGB Headquarters regarding the defection, the NY Residency's opinion is that all KGB personnel assigned to the London Residency will be replaced. Concerning those KGB officers assigned to the NY Residency who might be known to LYALIN, source indicated that the prevalent opinion in the NY Residency is that no immediate action is necessary regarding possible replacement of these officers since the possibility exists that LYALIN might not recall specific names and identities.

Concerning the result of the defection upon current illegal service by the London KGB Residency, source indicated KGB Headquarters will continue the analysis of LYALIN's operational activities while assigned to London, will also review the files to which he (LYALIN) had access and, thereafter, formulate the necessary actions regarding the illegal agents known to LYALIN.

Source indicated that the NY KGB Residency was not informed concerning the motivation for LYALIN's defection. Source stated that LYALIN's official cover position while assigned to the London Residency is unknown to the source. Source indicated that LYALIN was a "rank and file" worker who occupied no supervisory position within the London Residency.

Source added that, based upon a conversation with [redacted] source learned that LYALIN entered the KGB in 1960. He was graduated in 1962 from the KGB Intelligence Institute 101 and, thereafter, pursued specialized courses relative to "Line S" techniques for approximately two or three years. In 1969, for reasons unknown to the source, LYALIN was transferred from the "S" Directorate to Department "V."

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It should be noted that the LYALIN, mentioned above, may be identical with OLEG A. LYALIN, Soviet defector mentioned in Bureau letter to WFO, 8/10/71, captioned [redacted]
[redacted]

NY 105-New

In light of this situation, it is again noted, that, if disseminated further, every precaution is urged to present ~~the above information~~ in such a manner as to fully protect

b7D

Contacts with the source regarding this matter are continuing.

~~SECRET~~

Oleg Adolfovich LYALIN

A. RELATIONS

1. Father

LYALIN RUSSIA
Adolf. Born 1898, died 23.9.1952 of heart attack.
Chief engineer of the SLEZETROV (ph) (electrical
and engineering equipment for agricultural purposes).

1937: Expelled from Party - reason not known.
During war joined partisan movement, received
decorations, discharged on grounds of health,
returned home in 1944 and allowed to join Party
again.

1944 until death: Chief of Planning Department of
City Council of PYATIGORSK.

2. Mother

Born 1905 or 1906. Teacher, graduate of Higher
Political School. Party member. Pro-Stalin.

1950: Separated from husband and went to live in
village of MAKHAVOYE near ARYOL where she was
director of a school.

After husband's death in 1952 returned to PYATIGORSK
and obtained position as geography teacher.

1954: Accused of collaborating with Germans during
the war.

1956: Cleared of collaboration charge but was in ill
health (only 1 lung) and could not work so retired to
TSESIS in Latvia. Visited Czechoslovakia (1964) as
representative of Teachers' Union of Latvia.

In receipt of a pension.

Refuses to speak to LYALIN because she hates the KGB
as a result of her experience with it when accused
of collaborating. LYALIN gets news of her through
his sister.

3.

KIABOROVSK.

Graduate of Moscow Aviation Institute Faculty of
Radar.
senior Institute,
for the Army on aeroplanes.

Name unknown. (Probably KGB). Lives in Kiev.

NOV 11 1971

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~~REC 10~~

4. Stepbrother (Deceased).

Aleksander child of father's first marriage.
Joined the Airforce. Killed on 2.5.1945.

5.

RUSSIA

Father: Bootmaker. Mother: Housewife

Klasyeda.

6.

RUSSIA

7.

8.

9.

Georgi Ivanovich STESHKO, born 31.10.15.

identified GRU.

Soviet Russia.

10.

O. A. LYALIN

(1) LYALIN was born on 24.6.1938, at STAVROPOL but was not registered until 28.8.1938 and the latter date is therefore his official birthday. During the war years he lived with his mother in German-occupied PYATIGORSK. In 1950 when his parents separated he remained with his father in PYATIGORSK. After his father's death there was very little money and he was obliged to leave school and find work. He continued to attend school in the evenings.

(2) LYALIN entered the Higher Marine School, NAVINSK (ph) Street, 10, Odessa in 1954 and remained there until 1959. He entered by means of a competitive examination consisting of mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Literature and an Oral examination in French, English or German (LYALIN chose English). Students lived in the School and uniform and

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meals were provided free. There were two sessions per year, Spring and Winter, but every year from September to November students were at sea gaining practical experience. LYALIN studied electrical marine engineering, astronomy, physics and economy of sea transportation. At the end of the course there are two exams: (1) The State Exams and (2) Universal Diploma which is a thesis on one particular subject which the student chooses out of five or six set by the Board of Deans. To obtain (1) and (2) is equivalent to a University degree.

(3) In 1957, while still a student, LYALIN was a crew member of a four masted schooner 'TOVARICH' (a confiscated German ship) making a goodwill tour of Western ports which included a two week visit to Portsmouth as guests of the Portsmouth Marine School and several Mediterranean ports. In 1958 he visited Kuwait and Suez about a tanker. When he left the School in 1959 he served aboard a cargo boat visiting local (i.e. Baltic) ports as third and later second officer until July 1960.

(4) At some time prior to 1957 whilst still a student at the Higher Marine School he was co-opted by the KGB to work against Western seamen and smugglers, (Transportation Department later 5th Sector Odessa KGB). There was nothing formal about this recruitment; a friend who was already a co-opted worker took him along to the Personnel Dept. of the School where it was arranged. His main qualification for this job was his command of English.

(5) In 1958/59 the KGB sent him on a training exercise to KISHINEV with false documents in the name of OLIG ALEKSANDROVICH LYALIN. His task was to find four named people and collect information about them. On his return he was offered a job in the illegal net.

(6) It was the Odessa KGB (for whom he was working as a co-optee) who recommended him for a place in the 101 School. He went for an interview and was accepted. Students lived in at the School. He commenced a two year course at the 101 School in August 1960. This course consisted of Chemistry, Photography, English and 'Tailing'. There was one lecture at the beginning of the course on the structure and purpose of the KGB. There are also six months and one year courses at the 101 School. LYALIN took his examinations before the end of his course and graduated in October 1961 and was sent to live in a private flat for a few months. There he read the English newspapers and wrote a paper on how to avoid the call-up in the U.S.A. After his graduation it was decided not to use him in the illegal net. He believes this was because of the divorce from his first wife which was then pending.

(7) On 29th April 1962 he was posted to Klaypeda where he was in Sub-Division I dealing with foreign seamen. His rank was "1 small star"; by the time he left Klaypeda he had "4 small stars". He was in the same sub-division for the whole of his stay in Klaypeda. The numbering of the sub-divisions changed while he was there and his became sub-division II.

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(8) In February, 1957, he was sent to Moscow to attend a six month course starting 1st March 1957 at the V. Department School at Galitziner. This school is still called the Galitziner but is now situated in the premises which used to be occupied by the 101 School on the road to BALASIKA 26 Kilometres from Moscow. Training at this school consisted of lectures on:-

- (a) Partisan warfare including organising a partisan army from a small group, and how to maintain security and prevent penetration by the local secret services or army intelligence. These

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Poland and Czechoslovakia.

- (b) Radio communications. Two army types of radio were shown, one weighed 24 kilograms and the other 35. They had very good tuning capacities. LYALIN describes a method of using film to obtain high speed. Coding, decoding and how to use 'a gamma' were also taught. LYALIN states that "because of my marine education I know what a radio is and I know how to do it so I was not even attending the lessons" i.e. at the Training Centre.
- (c) Explosives. Basic principles and precautions only were taught. "because everybody understands that as soon as you leave the school you will forget about it but it won't take you that long to renew it again".
- (d) A practical exercise in which the students were divided into groups of six and given a direction. The target would be a factory, rocket base, power station or something similar. The group would have to locate and identify the target, give a full description including plans, details of security measures and how entry might be effected and an assessment of its value as a target.
- (e) The same groups of six were each given a "theoretical task". Each were given two books and a good map of a different place and using only this they had to prepare a plan of where they could land, what equipment would be needed, how many people etc. Then they are given a place to find and describe fully including how to penetrate it and lastly they blew up a bridge. These last tasks are divided amongst the group who were supposed to be in radio communication (in fact they had no radio and used telephones). When all the tasks were finished the members reported back to the chief of the group (LYALIN was the chief of his group).
- (f) Parachute training. Three roubles per jump were paid as an incentive.

When the course was finished LYALIN returned to Klaypeda.

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(9) On 2nd May 1968 LYALIN was sent to Moscow and instructed to prepare himself for a mission to Czechoslovakia posing as an American tourist of German origin. This mission did not materialise as the situation in Czechoslovakia was brought under control and LYALIN returned to Klaypeda in mid-August, 1968.

(10) In November 1968 LYALIN was sent to Moscow for training prior to his U.K. posting. This included visits to most departments at KGB Headquarters although he admits that he managed to avoid some of these. He also received some instruction from the Foreign Trade organisation for his cover position. He arrived in the U.K. on 11.4.69.

(11) LYALIN speaks good English, some German and a little Spanish and French. He has visited Bulgaria, Turkey, France, Italy, Gibraltar, Sweden, Denmark, Poland and East and West Germany. His service in the U.K. was his only foreign posting.

(12) LYALIN's KGB rank is 4-star captain. He has been a party member since 1960 and was the Young Communist League leader in his group at the Higher Marine School.

(13) He has used the following aliases.

~~Oleg Aleksandrovich LYALIN.~~

~~Aaron Adolfovich SPOLYASSER.~~

~~MAKAROV.~~

~~GUTCH (ph. nickname).~~

16th September, 1971

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Rosen *R/S*

DATE: 10/4/71

FROM : E. S. Miller *EM*

1-Mr. Rosen
1-Mr. Miller
1-Mr. Branigan
1-Mr. Wannall

SUBJECT:

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter, E.S. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Cleveland _____
Ponder _____
Bates _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

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plus
I met with on Friday afternoon, 10/1/71. He is articulate, typically British, and has a long background in the security field. He indicated a sincere desire to cooperate with us and discussed in some detail the recent British action against 105 Soviet intelligence officers and its background.

stated that the drastic action had actually been under consideration for several years and was the culmination of a series of events and not, as the press claims, due to the recent defection of a Soviet officer. He indicated that a case against the Soviets had been carefully established with the British Foreign Ministry, and he said he would furnish us documents indicating the manner in which this had been accomplished as soon as they become available.

see memo
10-6-71
Wannall
With reference to Oleg Lyalin, the Soviet who defected to the British, stated that he was a KGB captain with a background in the department which arranges sabotage. To knowledge this is the first time the West has had a defector from this department. He said the information furnished by Lyalin indicates that the Soviets had a highly sophisticated and fully developed plan for effective sabotage in England; had personnel in place prepared to carry it out; and had plans for further personnel to parachute into England in time of emergency. noted that Lyalin actually had not planned to remain in England but expected to return to the USSR where he would continue to operate as an agent in place. His defection was precipitated by his involvement in a drunken driving arrest which came to the attention of the KGB in Moscow. A personal note to him from a friend at KGB headquarters was inadvertently

ESM:hc
(6)

105-216642
MGT-49

NOT RECORDED
102 OCT 12 1971

13 OCT 8 1971

51 OCT 13 1971

CONTINUED - OVER

ORIGINAL FILED IN 65-5081-1832

5-302

Memorandum Miller to Rosen

Re: [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

delivered to another KGB agent in London with the result that Lyalin was informed by his superior that he would have to return to Moscow with every indication that severe administrative action might be taken against him. Lyalin was told to return to his residence, pack his bags, and be prepared to leave at once. No guard was assigned to him, with the result that he returned to his office, collected all his own papers together with a number of documents dealing with the work of other KGB agents, and thereafter delivered the entire load to the British, for whom he had been working for sometime. [redacted] pointed out that Lyalin did not have access to information concerning operations in the United States other than that furnished him orally by one of his associates who had worked on the United States desk in Moscow. This material has already been furnished to us and [redacted] promised that any information whatever of any conceivable interest to us would be made available as soon as it was identified.

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b7D

The material which [redacted] furnishes to us will be carefully evaluated in light of our own problems in this country and separate memoranda prepared. It will be interesting to review the "selling job" which was necessary before British political leaders would approve action taken in this instance. In this regard he also noted since this operation had clearly documented the grave necessity not to underestimate Soviet aggressiveness, that "politicians" would be much more sympathetic to the investigative requirements involved in this business.

ACTION:

For information. It appears that [redacted] is genuinely interested in working with us.

b6
b7C
b7D

Let me have a memo on the material.

My list
SEP 23 1971

SUBJECT:
CHARACTER:
BUFILE:
NYFILE:
WFOFILE:



b6
b7C
b7D

16
IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

b7D

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE
SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
~~GROUP 1~~

The Bureau advised on 9/15/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

b7D

New York



1 - 105-New (LYALIN)
1 - New York

Bureau

2 - 105-199309
2 - 105-155046
2 - 105-186630
2 - 105-New
2 - 105-174923

WFO

1 - 105-98117

b6
b7C

DOWNGRADED TO

SECRET

Per C28WB/B64

Date 11/12/19

54 OCT 14 1971

105-216642 (Lyalin)
105-216642 -
NOT RECORDED

17 SEP 30 1971

S. J. Kee

[redacted]

To date, no additional communications have been received at the KGB NY Residency from Headquarters concerning the defection of OLEG LYALIN in Great Britain.

b6
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[redacted]

[redacted] arrived in NYC on 9/15/71 for a stay of a few days. [redacted] briefly discussed the LYALIN incident with [redacted] at which time, [redacted] indicated [redacted]

b6
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b7D

[redacted]

[redacted] KGB officers who know LYALIN or feel that he knows them, are speculating as to the reason behind this failure. [redacted]

b6
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b7D

[redacted] and, therefore, had not been questioned by [redacted] concerning [redacted] LYALIN. On 9/13/71, [redacted] visited the SMUN and was immediately questioned by [redacted] on this point. [redacted] advised that he did not know LYALIN and, in fact, had never heard of him. [redacted]

[redacted] KGB.

~~SECRET~~

(U)
EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1)
DATE 06-18-2015
C32W33B91

SAC, New York

9/29/71

105-216642-

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. J. P. Lee

1 - [redacted]

b6
b7C

(S)

(S)

(S)

ReBulet 9/2/71 [redacted] IS-R," and
New York airtel 9/17/71, entitled [redacted]

b6
b7C

(S)

Bureau does not
counterintelligence [redacted]

This operation may provide one indication of the extent of curtailment of 13th Department activity in the U.S. as a result of Lyalin's defection and it may also provide an indication as to the thoroughness of the Soviet's damage assessment.

b1
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(S)

In arriving at our decision as to how he will proceed in the future, we must always evaluate the source's natural response to a given situation so that we will not direct him to behave in a manner which might arouse Soviet suspicion.

In line with your suggestion, copies of Bureau communications which relate to Lyalin will be designated for your control file on him.

1 - New York (Oleg A. Lyalin)

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Cleveland _____
Ponder _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

57 OCT 7 1971 7 45 D

(S) MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

~~SECRET~~

(U)

ORIGINAL FILED IN
UNRECORDED COPY 18 18 3

WAB/c
B.F.R.
JEN

Letter to New York

Re: [redacted]

105 [redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

NOTE:

b6
b7C
b3

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] It has been agreed that prior to initiating disruptive action, we will use source to assess the 13th Department capability in California and whether they will use San Francisco Consulate as a base for such action. Referenced New York airtel again raises question of disruptive action [redacted] As Lyalin has furnished [redacted] some information concerning this case, we do not know yet whether the operation has been compromised. We will learn more by not initiating action at this time but rather in assessing Soviet actions in connection with the source in the immediate future.

b7D

~~SECRET~~ (U)

9/17/71

AIRTEL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-120709)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-61720)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

(S) 9/2/71 [REDACTED] captioned as above, and Bulet
[REDACTED] "S-R".

b1
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IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH
COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS SOURCE OF
INFORMATION.

b7D

On 9/2/71, a representative of the 902nd Military
Intelligence Group [REDACTED] to the NYO to bring up to date the
scheduled itinerary [REDACTED]
A tentative schedule of meetings with this source for briefing
and debriefing, was arranged through this representative and the NYO
is making its own arrangements [REDACTED]

(S)

b1
b3

4 [REDACTED] (RM)

(S) [REDACTED] (105- [REDACTED]) (OLEG A. LYALIN)

1 - New York (105- [REDACTED]) (OLEG A. LYALIN)
1 - New York

NJH:mbg
(7)

NOT RECORDED

152 001 4 1971

~~SECRET~~ (U)

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-

NY 105-61720

As the Bureau pointed out, however, in light of the recent defection in England of an Officer of the 13th Department, OLEG A. LYALIN, this meeting could very well be aborted by the Soviets. In line with this thinking, the NYO wishes to point out that if the meeting is consummated and if the subject does make an appearance, it could be the last opportunity for a long time to take advantage of a situation that could discredit the subject, cause the KGB considerable embarrassment and disrupt the efforts of the 13th Department for an extended period of time.

The NYO agrees with the Bureau that a defection approach to the subject is impractical and not feasible. Also, the knowledge we might gain, if this operation is allowed to continue, from the handling by the Soviets of the source in the west coast area, seem minimal to the amount of damage we might cause by exposing, not only the subject, but other KGB Officers worldwide, who have handled this source.

The Bureau is requested to make reference to NY TT 9/10/71, captioned "IRONCLAD; IS-R", wherein an informant had advised that the recent defector OLEG LYALIN, had spent approximately nine years in the Illegal Support Directorate before being transferred to the 13th Department, Sabotage and Assassination Group. The NYO has noticed that the Bureau has submitted communications under separate captions, of information received from [] concerning operations in which LYALIN was privy. The NYO would like the Bureau to consider the feasibility of submitting all information received concerning these two Departments to a NY control file (captioned OLEG A. LYALIN) being opened by this office for receipt of same. In this way the NYO can more properly evaluate this information and can more intelligently submit questions concerning these two Departments in which we have primary interest.

The Bureau's comments concerning the aforementioned suggestions are being solicited.

THREAT AS YELLOW

FBI

Date: 9/24/71

☐ IMMEDIATE

☐ URGENT

☒ NITEL

Transmit the message that follows by coded teletype:

TO: ☐ THE PRESIDENT

☐ THE VICE PRESIDENT

☐ ATT.: _____

☒ WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

ATT.: DR. HARRY A. KESSINGER

☐ SECRETARY OF STATE

☐ DIRECTOR

☐ DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

☐ AND NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER

☐ DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

☐ DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

☐ NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

☐ U. S. SECRET SERVICE (PID)

☒ ATTORNEY GENERAL (BY MESSENGER)

☐ _____

ATT: SENIOR OPERATION OFFICER

From: DIRECTOR, FBI

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Subject: SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES -
LONDON, ENGLAND

Tolson _____
Relt _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Cleveland _____
Ponder _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

(Text of message begins on next page.)

NOT RECORDED

42 SEP 29 1971

Approved SEP 28 1971

54007

1971

TYPE UNIT ☒

ORIGINAL FILED IN

6:10PM 9/24/71 IRC

PRIORITY

TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 906

ATT.: DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

TO: ATTORNEY GENERAL (BY MESSENGER)

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

UNCLASSIFIED

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

LONDON, ENGLAND

A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, ADVISED ON SEPTEMBER
TWENTYFOUR, NINETEEN SEVENTYONE, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MET WITH THE SOVIET CHARGE

D'AFFAIRES, SOVIET EMBASSY, LONDON, AND TOLD HIM THAT WITHIN TWO
WEEKS, NINETEEN SOVIET OFFICIALS MUST LEAVE ENGLAND. FORTYTHREE

END PAGE ONE

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b7C
b7D

PAGE TWO UNCLASSIFIED

OF THEM WILL BE DIPLOMATIC OFFICIALS, FOURTEEN SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIALS, TWENTYEIGHT FROM THE SOVIET TRADE DELEGATION AND SIX FROM ANCILLARY ESTABLISHMENTS SUCH AS AEROFLOT, INTOURIST, ETC. NONE OF THEM WILL BE TASS OR PRESS OFFICIALS. ADDITIONALLY THE CHARGE WAS TOLD THAT ANY SOVIET OFFICIALS POSSESSING VALID RE-ENTRY VISAS TO THE UNITED KINGDOM (UK) WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO RETURN.

CHARGE WAS TOLD THAT IN THE FUTURE EVERY TIME A MEMBER OF ANY SOVIET ESTABLISHMENT IS CAUGHT IN ACTIVITIES DETRIMENTAL TO THE SECURITY OF U. K. HE WILL BE DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA AND HE WILL NOT BE REPLACED.

AFTER THE NINETYONE OFFICIALS LEAVE, THE SOVIET EMBASSY PERSONNEL WILL BE FROZEN AS WILL PERSONNEL AT OTHER ESTABLISHMENTS, WHICH MEANS THAT THEY WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO BEEF UP ONE OR THE OTHER IN THE FUTURE.

IN ANTICIPATION OF POSSIBLE SAVAGE REACTION BY MOSCOW, THE CHARGE WAS TOLD THAT IF THERE IS SUCH A REACTION IN AN EFFORT
END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE UNCLASSIFIED

TO SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE BRITISH EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN MOSCOW,
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS THE CAPABILITY OF TAKING OTHER ACTIONS
BASED ON INFORMATION MADE AVAILABLE TO IT BY A SOVIET DEFECTOR.
ACCORDING TO SOURCE, THIS ACTION HAS BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION
FOR SOME TIME BUT FOR VARIOUS REASONS COULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT.

BT

NNNN

WH ZEV FBI ZERO ZERO SIX IMI 006 KKK

FBI DE WH ZEV 006 ((

1) DIRECTOR, FBI (105-157656)

9/24/71

SAC, NEW YORK (105-82431)

[REDACTED]

ReNYlet 7/9/71.

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED] EXTREME
CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION
ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD
CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

Since relat [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

source that the subject is actually [REDACTED]

On 9/10/71, [REDACTED] advised information was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] London KGB Residency had defected to [REDACTED]

The source learned that the subject was among
those KGB Officers in NY who knew this defector (OLEG A. LYALIN)
or were known to him.

On 9/22/71, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

This departure was obviously in haste as the subject
and his wife had taken a new residence in which they stayed
for only about a week. He had also indicated to friends that
he would remain in the US until the conclusion of the General
Assembly at the UN. The subject's departure would therefore
seem to be linked with the defection of OLEG LYALIN.

The usual LHM reflecting departure of Soviet nationals
will be submitted.

- 3 - Bureau (RM)
 (2 - 105-) (OLEG A. LYALIN)
 - New York (105-115626) (OLEG A. LYALIN) 105-216642-
 - New York

3:mbg

5 OCT 5 1971

NOT RECORDED
18 SEP 28 1971

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b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-157656

Sac, New York
SEP 23 1971

b6
b7C
b7D

*37
ph*
[Redacted]
WFOFILE:

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [Redacted]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [Redacted] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE
SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
~~GROUP 1~~

12
The Bureau advised on 9/10/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [Redacted]

b7D

New York

[Redacted]

1 - 105-LYALIN

[Redacted]

1 - New York

Bureau

2 - 105-186630
2 - 105-174923
2 - 105-143000
② - 105-LYALIN
2 - 105-142954
2 - 105-209668
2 - 105-131411

b6
b7C
b7D

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per C28W34B64

Date 11/4/2014

105-216642-
NOT RECORDED

5 SEP 28 1971

55
55 OCT 5 1971

105-216642

[Signature]

[redacted]

Source has determined that the defection of OLEG LYALIN in London, England, has had some affect upon the KGB NY Residency. In that regard, source has determined that [redacted]

[redacted] have both alluded to the LYALIN defection and in non-specific terms indicated that perhaps KGB should consider the possibility of establishing a special "service" within the Residency which would analyze the activities, behavior patterns, weaknesses, etc., of the Soviet personnel with the objective of preventing a similar defection. Source added that [redacted] implied that the receipt of a telegram from Headquarters addressed solely to [redacted] outlined this possibility.

Source determined from [redacted] that he [redacted] had come to the conclusion that if such a step were taken by Moscow, the special "service" which would be established within the NY Residency, would probably be composed of personnel assigned to the two Main Directorates, Moscow.

In this regard, source feels that [redacted] comments might be a prelude to the establishment of more stringent security measures within the Residency.

Source feels that the only personnel whom source can trust are [redacted]

Further, source determined that [redacted] of the NY Residency, had indicated that [redacted] was not known to OLEG LYALIN, nor did LYALIN know of [redacted] KGB affiliation.

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b6
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b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

Sac, New York
SEP 23 1971

28
phs
SUBJECT: SOVIETS NEVER ASSIGNED TO THE U.S.
CHARACTER: IS - R
BUFILE: 105-133949
NYFILE: 105-65761
WFOFILE:

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE
SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
GROUP I

The Bureau advised on 9/10/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

New York

1 - 105-LYALIN

1 - [REDACTED]

1 - New York

Bureau *12*

② - 105-LYALIN

2 - 105-134282

2 - 105-133949

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per C28W34864
Date 4/4/2014

105-216642
NOT RECORDED

5 SEP 28 1971

30
phs
55 OCT 5 1971

105-216642

3
phs

NY 105-65761

As indicated previously by the source, [redacted]
[redacted]

KGB Headquarters, Moscow, was scheduled to arrive in the U.S. in mid-September, 1971, on an inspection tour.

On the above mentioned date, source indicated that the NY Residency had not received any specific information concerning this proposed visit. Source feels that the recent defection in London, England, of KGB officer OLEG LYALIN, might have some influence on [redacted] failure to leave the USSR as scheduled. Source will remain alert for any further information concerning [redacted] arrival.

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b6
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b7D

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. E. S. MILLER *E.S.M.*
FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN
SUBJECT: OLEG A. LYALIN
ESPIONAGE - R

DATE: 9/30/71

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Bishop	
Mr. Miller, E.S.	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Dalbey	
Mr. Cleveland	
Mr. Ponder	
Mr. Bates	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Walters	
Mr. Soyars	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

This memorandum reports information contained in the September 30, 1971, edition of "The Evening Star," wherein the identity of subject is noted as Oleg Lialine.

Subject is the Soviet who defected to the British. Although his name has not appeared in the press, his defection has received worldwide publicity. Directly related to this defection was the action taken by the British Government wherein they declared 90 Soviet officials currently in England persona non grata and refused to permit an additional 15 Soviet officials reentry privileges.

The September 30, 1971, edition of "The Evening Star" contained a story (attached) entitled "Talkative Spy - Driving Rap Blew Lid." The article notes that "The Daily Express," a British newspaper, reported that a Soviet diplomat dropped a hint leading to the identity of "Oleg Lialine" as the defector.

Referral/Consult

Bufiles reflect

United States Soviet Ambassador
to the United Nations Malik.

however, neither
ever arrived in the U.S.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure

WOC:hke
(7)

~~1-Mr. E. S. Miller~~

1-Mr. E. S. Miller 121971
1-Mr. Bishop
1-Mr. Felt
1-Mr. Branigan
1-Mr. Cregar

105-216642

b6
b7C

REC-46

OCT 5 1971

MCT-1

ESPIONAGE

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gale _____
Ponder _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TALKATIVE SPY

Driving Rap Blew Lid

LONDON (AP) — A British newspaper said today the defector who blew the lid on a Soviet ring in Britain was a Russian trade official arrested last month for drunken driving.

The Daily Express said a hint dropped by a Soviet diplomat Tuesday night led it to identify the defector as Oleg Lialine.

Lialine's traffic case came up at Great Marborough Street Court, but he failed to appear. The small courtroom was jammed because of the newspaper story. Court attaches and police, present in unusual strength, declined comment. None would discuss even the theory that Lialine is under a British intelligence and Foreign Office umbrella that would satisfy the court and lead to shelving of the drunken-driving charge.

Hint From Embassy

The Express said the hint to identification came from Soviet Embassy second secretary Vladimir Pavlov, who told a reporter that the defector was a trade official recently involved in a traffic case.

After checking police records,

the newspaper concluded he meant Lialine, and splashed the story under a giant headline: "Super Spy Oleg."

Late editions of other newspapers picked up the Express story under headlines reading: "Master Spy Unmasked" and "Oleg the Spy Who Talked."

Asked to confirm the report, Soviet Embassy and British government officials refused comment.

The British have kept the defector's identity secret since announcing last Friday that a Soviet KGB (secret police) agent had chosen asylum here and handed over valuable information on other spies. The government then ordered 90 Russian officials out of the country and refused new visas to 15 others.

The Express said that after Lialine was arrested in central London early Aug. 30 he feared he would be in trouble with his superiors in Moscow, and decided to defect to Britain.

Police said Lialine refused to take a breath test to determine if he had been drinking, and was charged with driving while unfit through drink.

Not being a high-ranking

member of the Soviet trade mission, Lialine did not qualify for diplomatic immunity, the Express said, and the next day he pleaded not guilty to the traffic charge. He was released on \$120 bail.

Film Shows Spy

In another development, The British Broadcasting Corp. (BBC) said it has acquired films showing Soviet spies caught in the act of stealing secrets.

BBC-TV said it will air them tonight along with a studio interview with a British scientist who says he posed as a traitor to lure the Russians into a trap.

A blurry photo from the BBC film, published in most papers this morning, shows a man under a tree leaning to pick up something in the grass. The BBC said it shows a Soviet diplomat outside London picking up a secret message left by the scientist. Later, he is shown being arrested, the BBC said.

The network would not say who made the film. British observers speculated that it was leaked by the government to build evidence supporting the decision to expel the Soviet officials.

The Washington Post _____
Times Herald _____
The Washington Daily News _____
The Evening Star (Washington) A-1
The Sunday Star (Washington) _____
Daily News (New York) _____
Sunday News (New York) _____
New York Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Daily World _____
The New Leader _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The National Observer _____
People's World _____

Date 9/30/71

memo W.A. Branigan
to Mr. E.S. Miller

9/30/71

WOC/HKE

ENCLOSURE

105-216642-13

1 - Mr. Branigan (WFO Folder)
1 - Mr. J.P. Lee

SAC, WFO (105-52150)

10/13/71

Director, FBI (105-117821)

1 -

b6
b7C

File
Reurlet 9/29/71.

Although review of your files did not disclose information reflecting activities by subject in conformance with those described by Soviet intelligence officer who recently defected in England, it is desired that information in relet which might explain these circumstances be furnished in form suitable for dissemination so that this communication may be provided to Legat, London, for transmittal to for its use in connection with assessment of the defector's bona fides.

b7D

(1 - 65-Oleg A. Lyalin)

ECP:eco
(7)

NOTE:

advised that Soviet defector Lyalin reported that during subject's assignment in U. S. he operated agent who offered him information about special classified cars. WFO reviewed does not contain specific information to support this disclosure but ~~could~~ relate some information which might explain basis for Lyalin's disclosure; therefore, WFO being instructed to proceed as indicated.

b7D

DUPLICATE YELLOW

105-21664

NOT RECORDED
44 OCT 14 1971

51 OCT 18 1971

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

0010 1971

TELETYPE

STAT 388

URGENT 10-8-71

TO DIRECTOR NR 225

FROM LEGAT BONN

TRANSMITTED IN CODE -
PARAPHRASE IF DISSEMINATED

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Bishop _____
Mr. Miller, ES _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Casper _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Dalbey _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Ponder _____
Mr. Bates _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Walters _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, (OPERATIONS ABROAD), ESPIONAGE - R
HILEV.

ON OCTOBER EIGHT INSTANT

BY THE DEFECTOR, OLEG LYALIN, CONCERNING SOVIET ESPIONAGE AND
SABOTAGE PLANS WHICH PROMPTED BRITISH AUTHORITIES TO EXPEL ONE
ZERO FIVE DIPLOMATS FROM ENGLAND.

TO PREPARE A REPORT CONCERNING SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN
MINISTER OF INTERIOR, HANS DIETRICH GENSCHER.

END PAGE ONE

TELETYPED 10 OCT 18 1971

NOT RECORDED
191 OCT 14 1971

ORIGINAL FILED IN 65-1723-232-14

PAGE TWO

THIS REPORT, WHICH IS TO BE DELIVERED TO [REDACTED]
PERSONALLY BY [REDACTED] ON THE AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER EIGHT INSTANT,
ADVISES [REDACTED]

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THIS INFORMATION IS CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~". ADMINISTRATIVE:
COORDINATED LOCALLY.
RECEIVED 2:15 PM GXC

My list
OCT 6 1971

SUBJECT: SOVIET AND SOVIET BLOC INVESTIGATIVE SUGGESTIONS
CHARACTER: IS - R
BUFILE:
NYFILE: 105-81411
WFOFILE:

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE
SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
~~GROUP I~~

The Bureau advised on 9/10/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]
New York

1-105-115626 (LYALIN)
1-New York

10 Bureau

2-105-216642

2-105-

UNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per C28034864
Date 11-4-2014

2 D
105-216642 -
NOT RECORDED
170 OCT 14 1971

54 OCT 22 1971

NY 105-81411

The following information was furnished concerning the expulsion of 105 Soviets, allegedly all having some affiliation with Soviet Intelligence, from Great Britain as a result of information furnished concerning these individuals by the Soviet Defector, OLEG LYALIN.

The source recommended that perhaps some consideration should be given to publicizing in the British Press, photographs of Soviet Intelligence Officers assigned not only to the London Residency but likewise photographs of those currently assigned to the New York Residency, who were undoubtedly known to LYALIN. Such a move would set back the KGB for several years. Subsequently the photographs of the New York KGB Personnel could be published in the US Press on a theory that the British had furnished this information to the Bureau which was originally provided by LYALIN.

It was also suggested that consideration be given to implementing this list of identifications of KGB Personnel, both in London and the US with identification of additional "Line S" and "Line V" Officials as set forth in the KGB Headquarters Telephone Directory which was furnished the Bureau in 1969.

ny let
OCT 6 1971

SUBJECT: SOVIETS NEVER ASSIGNED US
CHARACTER: IS - R
BUFILE: 105-133949
NYFILE: 105-65761
WFOFILE:

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
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CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
GROUP I

The Bureau advised on 9/28/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]
New York Bureau

1- [REDACTED]
1-105-115626 (LYALIN)
1-New York

2-105-30687
2-105-216642
2-105-133949

DOWNGRADED TO

SECRET

Per C28W39864
Date 4/4/2011

105-216642 -
NOT RECORDED
170 OCT 14 1971

54 OCT 22 1971

NY 105-65761

The following information was furnished concerning the expulsion of 105 Soviets, allegedly all having some affiliation with Soviet Intelligence, from Great Britain as a result of information furnished concerning these individuals by Soviet Defector, OLEG LYALIN.

With reference to possible retaliation by the Soviet Government against Great Britain, it is felt that the current

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] As a result it is not known whether the Soviet Government will, in fact, take any strong issue with the British Government concerning mass expulsion.

It is the shared opinion of some KGB Officers that Foreign Minister. GROMYKO [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
Specific references in this matter are [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

nylist
OCT 6 1971

15
SUBJECT: OLEG LYALIN
CHARACTER: IS - R
BUFILE: 105-216642
NYFILE: 105-115626
WFOFILE:

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
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CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
~~GROUP 1~~

The Bureau advised on 9/28/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

New York

Bureau

1 - [REDACTED]
1 - New York

100
2 - 105-131411
2 - 105-216642

105-216642 -
~~NOT RECORDED~~
170 OCT 14 1971

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per C28W34864
Date 11/4/2014

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54 OCT 22 1971

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NY 105-115626

The following information was furnished concerning the expulsion of 105 Soviets, allegedly all having some affiliation with Soviet Intelligence, from Great Britain as a result of information ostensibly furnished concerning these individuals by the Soviet defector, OLEG LYALIN:

The account in the NY Press, which referred to LYALIN as a Major General, was completely inaccurate inasmuch as LYALIN had the rank of Captain and was designated a Sr. Operational Worker. LYALIN, in this position, was a rank and file KGB officer who could best be classified a "bellboy." He had not been particularly successful in his KGB career inasmuch as he had been actively working for approximately eight to nine years and had been unable to advance beyond the rank of Captain.

In connection with the general reaction within the NY KGB Residency to the British action of expulsion of such a large number of Soviets from Great Britain, it was reported that the common feeling is that some retaliatory measures will necessarily be taken by the Soviet Government.

On Monday, 9/27/71, subsequent to the discussion between Soviet Foreign Minister, ANDREI GROMYKO, and British Foreign Minister, Sir ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME, in the Soviet Mission building, GROMYKO

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GROMYKO

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NY 105-115626

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On Monday, 9/27/71,

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Regardless of all the speculation current in the
NY KGB Residency,

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No information has been developed to indicate that the NY Residency has been furnished the list of the identities of the 105 individuals who were expelled by Great Britain. Soviet Intelligence, including both KGB and GRU, did not have under assignment in the London Residency 105 intelligence officers. Apparently either Great Britain or LYALIN were mistaken in the number of intelligence personnel identified. In fact, KGB had 50 intelligence officers and the GRU had 35 officers assigned to this Residency. Of the 50 KGB officers in the London Residency, 15 were assigned to the Scientific and Technical Branch of that Residency.

NY 105-115626

LYALIN is believed to be approximately 33 to 35 years of age.

The seriousness with which the KGB has viewed the developments in London on the basis of LYALIN's defection is emphasized by the fact that KGB Headquarters has advised [redacted] to prohibit intelligence meetings between KGB officers and their most important American agents. This directive was issued by [redacted] on Thursday, 9/23/71, and, as a result, only the most insignificant meetings have taken place since that date. There is no indication as to how long this prohibition will be in effect.

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ny list
OCT 6 1971

SUBJECT: OLEG LYALIN
CHARACTER: IS - R
BUFILE: 105-216642
NYFILE: 105-115626
WFOFILE:

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
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CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
~~GROUP 1~~

The Bureau advised on 9/28/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]
New York Bureau

1 [REDACTED] 2-105-156058
1 [REDACTED] 2-105-157656
1-65-23722(Security Branch, NY) 2-65-69724
1-New York 2-105-216642

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per
Date

C28W34864
11/4/2014

105-216642-
NOT RECORDED
170 OCT 14 1971

54 OCT 22 1971

NY 105-115626

The following information was furnished concerning the expulsion of 105 Soviets, allegedly all having some affiliation with Soviet Intelligence, from Great Britain as a result of information furnished concerning these individuals by the Soviet Defector, OLEG LYALIN.

As a result of LYALIN's defection and in view of the fact that LYALIN undoubtedly knew them, [redacted] [redacted] had returned to the Soviet Union permanently in the past week or so, while [redacted] likewise assigned [redacted] is scheduled to depart NYC for the Soviet Union on a permanent basis on the evening of 9/29/71.

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It as also been rumored that LYALIN knew four "KR" Officers assigned to the New York Residency and a number of politicians. The basis for this presumption was the fact that LYALIN attended Intelligence School with them. The identities of these individuals have not been disclosed, nor is it possible at this time to speculate whether LYALIN's possible knowledge of the "KR" Officers would result in their being recalled to the USSR.

NYlet
OCT 6 1971

✓
SUBJECT: OLEG LYALIN
CHARACTER: IS - R
BUFILE: 105-216642
NYFILE: 105-115626
WFOFILE:

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
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CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
~~GROUP 1~~

The Bureau advised on 9/28/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]
New York Bureau

1. [REDACTED] 2-105-186630
1. [REDACTED] 2-105-155040
1. [REDACTED]
1. [REDACTED] 2-105-216642
1-New York

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per C28634864
Date 11/4/2014

105-216642 -
NOT RECORDED
170 OCT 14 1971

54 OCT 22 1971

NY 105-115626

The following information was furnished concerning the expulsion of 105 Soviets, allegedly all having some affiliation with Soviet Intelligence, from Great Britain as a result of information furnished concerning these individuals by Soviet Defector, OLEG LYALIN.

The source advised that he personally does not believe



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LYALIN



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On the preceeding Thursday, September 23, 1971, all KGB personnel were exhibited a picture of OLEG LYALIN and the woman with whom he defected. [redacted] immediately replied that he knows LYALIN and undoubtedly LYALIN knows him. LYALIN's picture was also exhibited to all GRU personnel assigned to the New York GRU Residency.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *EM*

FROM : W. A. Branigan *WAB*

SUBJECT: SOVIET DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

1 - Mr. M. Felt
1 - Mr. A. Rosen
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop

DATE: 10/6/71 *jm*

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

1 -
1 -

Tolson *✓*
Felt *✓*
Rosen *✓*
Mohr *✓*
Wick *✓*
Casper *✓*
Callahan *✓*
Conrad *✓*
Dalbey *✓*
Cleveland *✓*
Ponder *✓*
Bates *✓*
Tavel *✓*
Walters *✓*
Soyars *✓*
Tele. Room *✓*
Holmes *✓*
Gandy *✓*

Washington Post

recounts recent action by British Government in expelling 105 Soviet diplomats from that country on basis of disclosures by the Soviet defector, Oleg Lyalin, and thereafter

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(ATTACHED)

ACTION:

EM

For information.

65-30092

ECP:eco

60 OCT 19 1971

OCT 13 1971

WBS

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

1 - Mr. J. P. Lee

~~REC-128~~

~~105-22352-132~~

October 19, 1971

105-216642-

16371

RE: OLEG A. LYALIN

~~EX-102~~

Reference is made to your memorandum dated September 8, 1971.

With regard to the information furnished by Oleg Lyalin concerning Nikolai Alekseevich Kuznetsov, there is attached a copy of a memorandum dated October 6, 1971, setting out information concerning his terms of service in the United States. In addition, it is known that Kuznetsov was involved in an attempt to recruit a chemist while here; however, we have no information indicating his recruitment of an electronics and computer technician. It is requested that, if possible, Lyalin be questioned further concerning any additional information he might have about the identity of the technician recruited.

Enclosure

1 - London (Enclosure)

1 - 100-769

1 - Foreign Liaison Desk (Route through for review)

Delivered to Washington Representative of ☐ on 10-19-71 by ap

JPL:pjc
(7)

NOTE:

This is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since it contains information so classified by ☐ relating to the revelations of Oleg A. Lyalin, Soviet defector. Lyalin furnished information that Kuznetsov had been in the U.S. twice and on his first tour of duty had recruited a technician connected with electronics and computers and was decorated. Bureau files show that Kuznetsov attempted to recruit a chemist working in Wilmington, Delaware, in 1954. This chemist was under the control of the Bureau. New York dated its letter and LHM 9/6/71 and it should be 10/6/71. 0-17 has been sent.

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per C32W33B91

Date 11/12/04

~~TOP SECRET~~

59 OCT 26 1971

105-22352-132

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FILED IN

~~SECRET~~

(U) EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1)
DATE 06-18-2015
C32W33B91

DIRECTOR, FBI (105-22352)

10/6/71

SAC, NEW YORK (105-5803)

NIKOLAI ALEKSEEVICH KUZNETSOV
IS - R

ReBulet 9/22/71, captioned "OLEG A. LYALIN; IS-R".

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are six copies of
an LHM reflecting background information of subject.

Attachment to relet contains information furnished
by OLEG A. LYALIN concerning the subject as follows:

"2. Until October/November 1969, the head of Dept. V.
in the USA was Nikolay Alekseyevich KUZNETSOV who was in the U.N.
in New York. This was his second posting in the U.S. On the
first, he recruited a technician connected with electronics and
computers for which he received a very high decoration. He was
not liked in headquarters because he was always emphasizing his
superior position and the fact that he had been decorated.
During this second posting in the U.S., he produced no practical
results and after encountering some 'difficulties' was obliged
to return unexpectedly to Russia in October or November 1969
leaving all his possessions behind. LYALIN believes that he is
now teaching. [redacted]
believed by LYALIN [redacted]

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Enclosed LHM classified "~~TOP SECRET~~" as communication
received from [redacted] so classified.

The sources who identified the subject as affiliated
[redacted]

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(S)

The subject was active in attempting to recruit [redacted]
whom he first met in 1954. This may be the [redacted]

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- 3 - Bureau (Encl. 6) (RM) (C)
(2 - 105-216642) (OLEG LYALIN)
1 - New York (105-115626) (OLEG LYALIN)
1 - New York

JB:mbg
(5)

105-216642-
NOT RECORDED
199 OCT 8 1971

59 OCT 26 1971

~~SECRET~~

(U)

105-22352-132
NOT RECORDED

NY 105-5803

In early 1967, [redacted] advised the subject recently arrived in the US [redacted]

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[redacted] The source advised [redacted]

This source vaguely recalls the subject as having attended [redacted]

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NYlet of 10/22/68, reflects the details of an automobile accident in which the subject was involved on 9/11/68.

The subject departed the US on 9/17/68, presumably on home leave. He retained his apartment at 66-10 Thornton Place, Forest Hills, NY, which was subsequently occupied by another Soviet.

[redacted] advised that information was received at the SMIN that subject's return to the US had been delayed [redacted]

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The subject did not return again to the US.

The [redacted] LYALIN [redacted]

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Information from [redacted] [redacted] which is set forth above, is not set forth in enclosed memorandum in order to protect their identity. (S)

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

New York, New York

October 6, 1971

Nikolai Alekseevich Kuznetsov

The subject was born on October 15, 1921, in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). He first arrived in the United States on February 17, 1953, as an employee of the United Nations Secretariat (UNSEC) in the Russian Translation Unit. He departed the United States on May 13, 1954, and returned on December 3, 1954, with his wife, Stepanida Kuznetzova. He remained in the United States until July 11, 1957, when he returned to the Soviet Union.

The subject returned to the United States on December 23, 1966, as First Secretary of the Soviet Mission to the UN. He departed the United States for Montreal, Canada, and purportedly the Soviet Union on November 15, 1967, and returned to the United States on December 25, 1967. He last departed the United States on September 17, 1968.

The subject was involved in an automobile accident on September 11, 1968, and it is not known whether or not this was the reason for his departure on September 17, 1968.

The subject maintained his apartment in New York upon his departure on September 17, 1968, and it was subsequently occupied by another Soviet national.

Based upon available information and/or investigation the data furnished by Oleg Lyalin concerning subject's Soviet intelligence affiliation appears to be accurate.

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

- 1* -

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS NEITHER
RECOMMENDATIONS NOR CONCLUSIONS
OF THE FBI. IT IS THE PROPERTY OF
THE FBI AND IS LOANED TO YOUR
AGENCY. IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE
NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE
YOUR AGENCY.

105-211040
ENCLOSURE

Downgraded
TOP SECRET
1/29/15
(U)

my list
OCT 6 1971

ST
(A)
SUBJECT: *0* OLEG LYALIN
CHARACTER: IS - R
BUFILE: 105-216642
NYFILE: 105-115626
WFOFILE: 105-

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
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CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
~~GROUP 1~~

The Bureau advised on 9/28/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

New York

Bureau

WFO

1- [REDACTED]	2-105-22313	1-105-11280
1- [REDACTED]	2-105-199309	1-105-98117
1-New York	2-105-216642	1-105-

DOWNGRADED TO

SECRET

Per *28034369*
Date *4/4/2014*

105-216642
NOT RECORDED
170 OCT 14 1971
[Signature]

54 OCT 22 1971

NY 105-115626

The following information was furnished concerning the expulsion of 105 Soviets, allegedly all having some affiliation with Soviet Intelligence, from Great Britain as a result of information furnished concerning these individuals by the Soviet Defector, OLEG LYALIN.

The source advised that it was his personal feeling that undoubtedly LYALIN would know [REDACTED]

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SUBJECT: OLEG LYALIN
CHARACTER: IS - R
BUFILE: 105-LYALIN
NYFILE: 105-115626
WFOFILE:

NY let
OCT 5 1971

28/10
IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
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CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
~~GROUP 1~~

The Bureau advised on 6/22/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

New York

1 [REDACTED]
1 [REDACTED]
1 - New York

Bureau

2 - 105-155046
2 - 105-120709
② 105-LYALIN

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per

Date

628034664

11/4/2014

105-216642-

NOT RECORDED

170 OCT 14 1971

54 OCT 22 1971

105 - 216642

NY 105-115626

As indicated previously, source had mentioned that [redacted] Amtorg Trading Corporation (ATC), NYC [redacted] OLEG LYALIN. [redacted] advised at that time that he did not know LYALIN and, in fact, had never heard of him.

Source learned that on 9/21/71 a communication had been received from KGB Headquarters requesting that the NY Residency resolve the question of how well [redacted] knew LYALIN inasmuch as they had [redacted]

This communication stated that [redacted] had been [redacted] LYALIN [redacted]

Source learned that [redacted] LYALIN inasmuch as he and [redacted]

[redacted] indicated that although LYALIN [redacted] LYALIN [redacted]

Source added that the same communication from Moscow, which related to [redacted] LYALIN, contained some reference to [redacted]

[redacted] Source was not aware of the nature of the inquiry and could not speculate on that situation.

Source stated [redacted]

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NY 105-115626

Source stated that, as a result of LYALIN's defection, it is the consensus of opinion within the NY Residency that, at the present time, the Department of Personnel, KGB Headquarters, is conducting an analysis to determine who might be acquainted with LYALIN and vice versa. This analysis would develop where LYALIN had been trained, where he had previously served, the extent of his activities while in training and serving abroad, the files to which he had access, the operations of which he had knowledge, etc.

Only upon completion of this analysis would KGB make a determination concerning those intelligence officers abroad who might have to be recalled to the USSR for security purposes.

SUBJECT: OLEG LYALIN
CHARACTER: IS - R
BUFILE: 105-LYALIN
NYFILE: 105-115626
WFOFILE:

ny list
OCT 5 1971

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
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CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
~~GROUP 1~~

The Bureau advised on 6/22/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

New York

Bureau

1 [REDACTED]
1 - New York

105-80533
105-LYALIN

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per
Date

C28W34B64
11/4/2016

105-216642
NOT RECORDED
170 OCT 14 1971

54 OCT 22 1971

105-216642

J. J. [Signature]

NY 105-115626

Source indicated that on 9/20/71 [redacted]
[redacted] Foreign Minister, ANDREI GROMYKO,
told source that, as a result of the LYALIN defection, KGB
had recalled nine KGB officers assigned to the London KGB
Residency. [redacted] is in the US in connection with the UN
26th General Assembly.

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Records. INS. NYC, indicated that [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

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He was destined to attend the UNGA at the
UNSEC.

SUBJECT: OLEG LYALIN
CHARACTER: IS - R
BUFILE: 105-LYALIN
NYFILE: 105-115626 (u)
WFOFILE:

~~TOP SECRET~~

My let
OCT 5 1971

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
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WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION. (S) (S) (U)

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE
SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION. (S) (S) (U)

CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~

The Bureau advised on 9/22/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED] (S) (S) (U)

New York

1 - 105-61720 [REDACTED]
1 - 100-6587 (SODAC-MEXICO)
1 - New York

Bureau

2 - 105-120709
2 - [REDACTED]
2 - 105-LYALIN

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per C28634864
Date 11/11/2014

105-216642-
NOT RECORDED
170 OCT 14 1971

CLASSIFICATION RETAINED BY 6922 WNP/RWS-EBM
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2, 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE.

54 OCT 22 1971

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD
OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP
ON 8-11-78

NY 105-115626

~~TOP SECRET~~

Source has learned through [redacted]

[redacted]
of the Mexico City KGB Residency had arrived in NY on 9/20/71 enroute to the USSR. [redacted] indicated that this individual had been recalled to the USSR inasmuch as he was personally known to OLEG LYALIN. Source determined that [redacted] expected to spend some time with that individual, both in shopping and showing points of interest in NYC. [redacted] feels that this KGB officer was scheduled to leave the US for the USSR on the evening of 9/22/71. (TS) (S) (U)

Records. INS. indicated that one [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~

My list
OCT 5 1971

14
SUBJECT: OLEG LYALIN
CHARACTER: IS - R
BUFILE: 105-
NYFILE: 105-115626
WFOFILE:

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE
SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
~~GROUP 1~~

The Bureau advised on 9/17/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

New York

- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - 105-65761 (SOVIETS NEVER
ASSIGNED US)
- 1 - New York

Bureau

- 2 - 105-63683
- 2 - 105-51610
- 2 - 105-128096
- 2 - 105-133949
- 110* - 105-

105-216642
NOT RECORDED
170 OCT 14 1971

DOWNGRADED TO

SECRET

Per C28W34B64
Date 4-4-2014

54 OCT 22 1971

105-216642

5-88P-12

NY 105-

No additional information has been received relating to the defection of OLEG LYALIN in London, England. The NY Residency is amazed that no information, to date, has been released to the press informing the public of this defection.

On 9/16/71, [redacted] UN, [redacted] and [redacted] who arrived in the US around 9/12/71 [redacted] engaged in a conversation with [redacted]

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A review of the files of the NYO reflect that the Deputy referred to above who replaced [redacted]

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During this conversation, LYALIN's defection was discussed. [redacted] State Committee on Science and Technology (SCST) indicated that he had learned of this defection in Moscow [redacted]

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[redacted] It has been reported that [redacted] SCST and is scheduled for assignment to Paris, France, [redacted]

[redacted] during the above conversation, stated he became aware of the defection in Moscow [redacted] (European) Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has Great Britain under its jurisdiction.

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No KGB personnel within the NY Residency have been recalled to Moscow because of knowledge of LYALIN. The NY Residency has assumed a "wait and see" attitude and will take no action unless personnel at the Residency are publicly identified by LYALIN or unless Headquarters so directs.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-211311)

DATE: OCT 5 1971

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-113224)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

ReBulet 7/6/71 and NYlet to the Bureau, 7/8/71:

Enclosed for the Bureau are ten copies of an LHM reflecting authorized interview of subject at NY on 8/29/71. LHM is classified "**CONFIDENTIAL**" inasmuch as it reflects an investigative interest in an employee of the UN.

Interview was conducted by SAs [REDACTED] of the NYO at subject's residence. It is noted that during the course of the interview subject did not appear overly nervous, answered all questions freely, recognized the legitimacy of Bureau Agents interviewing him and related that he would contact the NYO if he should ever be contacted in a manner similar to his association with [REDACTED] noted in enclosed LHM.

REQUEST OF THE BUREAU

In view of the NYO being unaware of the current political situation in Cyprus and the degree of prominence of the subject and his relatives in Cyprus, the Bureau, through liaison channels,

6 - Bureau (Enck. 10) (RM)

(1 - [REDACTED])
(1 - [REDACTED])
(1 - [REDACTED])
(1 - [REDACTED])
(4 - 105-216642) (LYALIN)

1 - New York [REDACTED]
1 - New York [REDACTED]
1 - New York [REDACTED]
1 - New York (105-115626) (LYALIN)
1 - New York [REDACTED]

RAH:mbg
(11)

105-216642-
NOT RECORDED
100 OCT 7 1971



ENCLOSURE

6 OCT 26 1971

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

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b6
b7C

b6
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ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-11311-1

NY 105-113224

is requested to contact [] for an evaluation of the possibility that subject was contacted by [] due to his background and/or relatives' involvement in Cypriot politics.

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[] should be further contacted for any information that may have come to their attention relative to the subject's most recent 2½ month (6/12/71 to approximately 9/1/71) home leave visit to Cyprus.

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It is felt that this evaluation is further deemed desirable in view of the recent arrests of Cypriot nationals in London by [] (September, 1971). Bureau views are also solicited concerning the noted arrests of Cypriots. "New York Times" newspaper (10/1/71) accounts of these arrests speculate a connection with the most recent defector LYALIN. The common denominator of Cypriot nationals and Line "V" possibly exists in both instant and the LYALIN case. (It is noted in passing that [] has departed the US, 9/30/71, somewhat prematurely).

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In view of subject's failure to notify this Bureau of his association with [] and his expressed desire to remain apolitical in all of his dealings (with the exception of Cypriot affairs) it is not felt that he possesses a potential for development as an informant of the NYO at the present time.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

New York, New York

OCT 5 1971

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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During July and August, 1970, Special Agents (SAs)
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed [REDACTED]
in contact with [REDACTED] New York.

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[REDACTED]

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Based on available information, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] is considered to be
connected with the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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On September 29, 1971, [REDACTED] was interviewed by SAs
of the FBI at his residence located at [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] New York.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions
of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to
your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed
outside your agency.

105-216642

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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[REDACTED]

At the outset of this interview, the jurisdiction and responsibilities of the FBI in the field of internal security were fully explained and he recognized the legitimacy of his being contacted by SAs of the FBI. He was told that the FBI did not conduct investigations relating to the legitimate activities of personnel employed by the UNSEC.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was advised that experience has indicated that the Soviets and other Communist bloc officials assigned to the UN while employed with the UNSEC have, on occasion, attempted to obtain information of value to their countries by utilizing other members of the UNSEC staff.

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[REDACTED] stated that he is in almost daily contact with a Soviet national by the name of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The decision to place a Soviet national under him was made by the UNSEC administration due mainly to the fact [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was considered to be of some assistance on this project. [REDACTED] has in no way made any requests which could be construed as having intelligence significance. He confided that his own impression of [REDACTED] is that he is involved only in statistical matters and is too timid and not sufficiently aggressive to be involved in intelligence matters.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted]
United States August 28, 1971, on home leave.) [redacted] related that [redacted] is currently on leave and his mail is being directed to [redacted] desk indicating to him that [redacted] evidently used his desk while he, [redacted], was on vacation. [redacted] does not consider this to be unusual due to the shortage of space in his Department.

[redacted] is familiar with a few other Soviet nationals employed at the UNSEC with whom he associates for work purposes only and occasionally meets at the cafeteria during lunch time. At no time have any of these individuals asked him to do anything which could be considered intelligence associated.

[redacted] replied negatively to questions relating to social contacts with any of these Soviets. At this point in the interview a group of photographs of various Soviets employed at the UN was displayed to [redacted] with the basic question asking if he had ever seen these individuals. [redacted] immediately and without hesitation picked up a photograph of [redacted] [redacted] could not recall [redacted] (name) and related the following:

Some time during the summer of 1970, while eating lunch at the UN cafeteria [redacted] came up to [redacted] table, sat down, and began eating and talking to him. This was considered by [redacted] unusual only in that [redacted] did not say hello or offer even a perfunctory request to join him for lunch. During this initial meeting they spoke only of their jobs at the UN and of [redacted] country they came. [redacted] at this point determined that [redacted]

[redacted] At this point in his career [redacted] stated that he was very conscious of not showing prejudice to any nationality group and basically was very outgoing and spoke to anyone who spoke with him. Shortly after this initial meeting with [redacted] they again met in the Independent IND Subway station near the UNSEC building and exchanged greetings. He discovered that [redacted] took the same train home as he did and exited at the Union Turnpike Station in Queens, New York.

[redacted] stated that he occasionally exited at this Union Turnpike Station and walked home but more frequently he would continue on the subway to the Parsons Boulevard exit of this same subway line and take a bus to his residence.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted]

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After seeing each other on the subway a few times [redacted] to a bar (name unrecalled) just outside the Union Turnpike station for a drink. They did this on approximately two occasions, spending not more than one-half hour in the bar. During these occasions [redacted] questioned [redacted] mostly about the Government in Cyprus and his relatives who are still living there. [redacted] came to realize that [redacted] had begun waiting for him in the subway at a spot most convenient for his own entry and departure from any particular train.

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On one of these occasions [redacted] invited [redacted] out to dinner, ostensibly to celebrate a promotion he had received. [redacted] declined this invitation stating he would have to give his wife more notice when he would not be coming home for dinner. Upon [redacted] insistence they agreed to meet at a future date and go out to dinner at that time. They met after work at the Parsons Boulevard exit of the IND Subway line and walked to Constantine's Restaurant located at the junction of Parsons Boulevard and Hillside Avenue, Queens. After dinner they parted company and [redacted] went home.

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On another occasion [redacted] met at the Parsons Boulevard-Hillside Avenue Station and walked to a nearby park and talked for a period of about one-half hour. [redacted] questioned [redacted] once again about Cyprus and asked if [redacted] could obtain some books on Cyprus and also pertaining to statistics. At this point in their association [redacted] realized that his meetings with [redacted] were developing along lines that were not normal or natural. He told [redacted] that he [redacted] could obtain such books from any number of libraries in the vicinity of, and the UN itself. After this meeting in the park [redacted] met [redacted] once more at the Parsons Boulevard-Hillside Avenue exit of the subway. On this occasion he invited [redacted] to accompany him to a football game taking place in the same park where they had previously met. [redacted] that he simply could not spend so much time away from his family and had to go home.

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[redacted] related that this was the last time that he saw [redacted] and has not even seen him at the UN cafeteria.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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[redacted]

As a result of this association with [redacted]
[redacted] stated that he is not as outgoing and friendly an individual as he once was and basically shies away from associations with strangers. He considers himself to be apolitical in all matters except those concerning Cyprus. His feelings concerning Cyprus are basically Turkish which is contrary [redacted] and is based much on his being arrested by the Greeks and his conviction that the Greeks are responsible for the [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FBI

Date: 10/1/71

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL _____

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74228)

FROM: SAC, BOSTON (65-5256) (P)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

(OO:BS)

Re Bureau airtel to Boston, 9/21/71, captioned as above; Bureau airtel to New York, 9/22/71, captioned, "OLEG A. LYALIN, IS-R," enclosing single copies of three memoranda furnished by [REDACTED] and Boston teletype to Bureau, 10/1/71.

Enclosed for the Bureau are ten copies of an LHM dated as above and captioned [REDACTED]

Also enclosed for the Bureau are four copies of a photograph of subject as obtained from the files of INS, Boston. It is requested that two photographs be retained in Bureau files and the remaining two photographs be forwarded to Legat, London, for use in handling requested investigation to be conducted by [REDACTED] as set forth hereinafter. It is further requested that the Bureau forward to Legat, London, appropriate copies of the enclosed LHM.

The confidential source [REDACTED] mentioned in the LHM is the [REDACTED]

Subject was interviewed at the residence of his [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] JOHN E. MULVANEY.

- 5 - Bureau (Encs. 14) (RM) (1 - 105-) (OLEG A. LYALIN)
(2 - Legat, London)
3 - Boston
(1 - 105-19316) (OLEG A. LYALIN)
JEM:EG
(8)

NOT RECORDED

192 OCT 19 1971

ENCLOSURE

DOWNGRADED TO

SECRET

CARBON COPY 65-74228-64

Date 11/4/74

Approved: [Signature]

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

M

Per

54 OCT 21 1971

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ORIGINAL FILED IN 65-12228-

Subject was advised that the Bureau has no interest in the legitimate and normal operations of Quincy Junior College, Quincy, Mass. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Following subsequent interrogations of OLEG A. LYALIN [REDACTED]

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The inability of the Boston Office at this time [REDACTED]

that the bona fides of OLEG A. LYALIN has not, as yet, been established, the magnitude of his disclosures notwithstanding. It can be assumed that several months or even a longer period of time will elapse before [REDACTED] feels that a basis exists on which to offer a reasonable estimate concerning LYALIN's bona fides.

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The Boston Office is giving consideration to the possibility that the receipt of additional information concerning subject may dictate the need of a re-interview of subject. Bureau authority will be requested if the Boston Office, at some future date, considers a re-interview of subject desirable. In the meantime, this Office will await additional information supplied by [REDACTED] and accept [REDACTED] fairly [REDACTED]

b7D

The Bureau may desire to designate a copy of the LHM to INS Headquarters, Washington, D.C., on a high level basis in view of the sensitive nature of information contained in LHM. Such information presumably would be of interest to INS in view of subject's alien status in the U.S.

The LHM is classified ~~TOP SECRET~~ since it contains information extracted from an [REDACTED] memorandum dated 9/8/71, which bears a similar classification.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Boston, Massachusetts

October 1, 1971

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~ (U)

Per C28W34864

Date 11/4/2014

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Basis for Investigation

A confidential source abroad furnished the following information during September, 1971, which source obtained from a Soviet intelligence officer assigned to the Soviet Embassy, London, England, and who defected in London during early September, 1971:

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[redacted] Oleg A. Lyalin, also a KGB intelligence officer. [redacted]

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[redacted] motive was mercenary in nature and Lyalin paid him 40 pounds for one year. [redacted] signed receipts in the name of [redacted]

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[redacted] information, which from an industrial point of view was considered very good, was primarily of interest to the Scientific and Technical Section (STS), which was prepared to pay 200 pounds for a complete set of Stanley Research Centre reports.

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

ENCLOSURE

105-216642-

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

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[redacted]

During the second half of 1970, [redacted] was introduced to [redacted] of the KGB, but [redacted] did not care for [redacted] [redacted] departed London, destined to the United States, at the end of 1970 without informing [redacted]

The above confidential source abroad is in possession of no information concerning any attempt by the KGB to recontact [redacted] arrival in the United States. However, authorities in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) requested that Lyalin furnish [redacted] current address. Lyalin planned to obtain this address through [redacted]

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[redacted] initially furnished [redacted] name to the KGB.

According to the above confidential source abroad, [redacted]


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Referral/Consult

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Referral/Consult



-3-

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

Referral/Consult




Interview of [redacted]


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On September 29, 1971 [redacted] was interviewed and furnished the following information:

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The following are the identities of [redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

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[REDACTED]

During approximately 1967 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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In London, England [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Following his arrival in the United States, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Newman Preparatory School, Boston,
Massachusetts, [REDACTED] Quincy
Junior College, Quincy, Massachusetts, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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The responsibility and jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in matters relating to the internal security of the United States, including espionage and sabotage, were explained to [REDACTED] following which he indicated a clear understanding of same. [REDACTED] asserted that he is in possession of no information that he feels would be of interest to the Federal Bureau of Investigation or to any Western intelligence agency. He declared that he strictly abides by the high moral standards of the Hindu religion and thus has never engaged in an immoral, criminal or unethical act, including espionage.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

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[redacted] denied ever having been knowingly in contact with a representative of the Soviet Union or a Communist-bloc country for any purpose whatsoever.

After steadfastly denying the above, it was brought to [redacted] attention that certain information has been brought to the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation alleging that [redacted] Shell International Oil Company in London, England, was on occasions in contact with Soviet intelligence officers assigned to the Soviet Embassy in London; and, furthermore, these contacts related to [redacted] furnishing the Soviets confidential Shell reports for which he was financially remunerated. At this point, [redacted] vehemently denied that such a situation ever existed and further denied that he ever had access to Shell documents. According to [redacted] it would have been impossible for him to remove Shell documents from the above office without detection.

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[redacted] was further informed that it has been alleged that he furnished the Soviets quarterly progress reports concerning the Stanley Research Centre in England. [redacted] firmly denied that he ever committed such an act and stated that he has never heard of the Stanley Research Centre.

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[redacted] also declared that the following individuals are totally unknown to him and added that he has never been knowingly in their presence:

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Oleg A. Lyalin

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[redacted]
[redacted] for any purpose whatsoever. [redacted] admitted to an [redacted]
[redacted] approximately five years ago. [redacted]

[redacted] Greater London Council, an agency which has the responsibility of registering motor vehicles [redacted]

[redacted] King George VI.

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

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[redacted] continued as follows:

[redacted] Since establishing residence in the United States, [redacted] have corresponded with [redacted] the last contact being a letter from [redacted] received during August, 1971, which was addressed to [redacted] Massachusetts, USA.

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[redacted] has heard nothing concerning [redacted] since the receipt of the above-mentioned letter.

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[redacted] added that during his contacts with [redacted] [redacted] never noted anything unusual with respect to [redacted] conduct, personal habits, or political motivations. [redacted] emphasized that at no time did [redacted] ever make any unusual offers to him or request [redacted] to engage in an untoward or improper act.

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[redacted] expressed awareness of continuous announcements that appeared in the American news media beginning September 24, 1971, relating to the mass expulsion from London, England, of Soviet diplomats by the British government on charges of engaging in intelligence activities based on information provided by a Soviet intelligence officer who openly defected in London, England, during September, 1971.

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[redacted] stated that he reacted in a very casual manner upon hearing the above news item, explaining that he has little concern over the affairs of the British government and also was preoccupied with personal matters, such as his college studies.

[redacted] stated that he fully recognizes the seriousness of the above allegations and for that reason desires to fully cooperate with United States authorities. [redacted] felt that to do otherwise could conceivably jeopardize his alien status in the United States.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

[redacted] was alerted to the possibility of being contacted in the United States by Soviet intelligence operatives and in this regard expressed a willingness to promptly notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the event a situation develops which can be considered as having intelligence significance, including a possible contact by a representative of the Soviet Union or a Communist-bloc country.

Information Provided by [redacted]

During the morning of September 30, 1971, [redacted] telephonically contacted the Boston Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Boston, Massachusetts, and disclosed that subsequent to the completion of the interview [redacted] by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation during the evening of September 29, 1971, [redacted] the details surrounding the interview, particularly allegations made by a source or sources that her husband had cooperated with Soviet intelligence in London. [redacted] expressed [redacted] for and confidence in the Federal Bureau of Investigation and wished to state for the record that [redacted] fully confide in each other concerning their past and current activities and problems, and for this reason she wished to term such allegations as completely false and without any factual basis.

[redacted] expressed hope that such allegations will not jeopardize [redacted] relationship with the Shell International Oil Company in London, since [redacted] expect that in the future they will re-establish residence in London and the probability exists that [redacted] will seek re-employment by the aforementioned company.

[redacted] further stated that [redacted] to cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation on any matter deemed necessary, including a subsequent interview or interviews.

[redacted] also advised that following the above discussion [redacted] attached some significance to a conversation on September 29, 1971, with [redacted] Massachusetts, who informed [redacted] that for the past five days she has observed the following described neighborhood activity, which [redacted] considered to be particularly suspicious:

[redacted]

At 7:30 each morning, an unidentified male individual driving a white or beige colored station wagon and on other days an unidentified male, possibly identical with the aforementioned unidentified male, operating a turquoise colored sedan, parks opposite the [redacted] and appears to display an interest in the [redacted] and activity in the immediate area. While seated in the car, this individual reads a newspaper until approximately 11 AM, when he drives from the area. This individual is observed by [redacted] to return to the above neighborhood at 3 PM each day and to remain until 6 PM, during which time he repeats the above-described activities. According to [redacted] [redacted] is unable at this time to furnish additional identifying data concerning the above unidentified male or vehicles.

[redacted] added that she is alarmed over the matter and has instructed [redacted] to make efforts to obtain additional identifying data concerning the above individual and vehicles should such a situation recur.

Referral/Consult

~~TOP SECRET~~

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LEADS:

The following requests are being made in connection with proposed additional interrogations of the Soviet defector in question:

Will display a photograph of [] for the purpose of obtaining a positive identification.

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Will determine if there is available documentary evidence linking [] with Soviet intelligence, such as a receipt of payment for intelligence services rendered and which bears [] signature.

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Will determine if the defector is in possession of additional information concerning [] on which [] might be challenged during re-interview.

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It is further requested that [] [] Shell International Oil Company, be questioned concerning [] in order to elicit any information that might contradict statements already made by [] on 9/29/71. During the questioning of [] it is suggested that the following points be developed:

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Referral/Consult

What type of personal reputation did [] establish at the above Shell office?

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Did [] have access to Shell documents?

Would it have been possible for him to remove Shell documents from the office premises and return a day or two later and escape detection?

Would it be expected that [] have some knowledge, if only by name, of the Stanley Research Centre?

-10*-

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

Routing Slip
FD-4 (Rev. 12-22-69)

Date 9/30/71

To: ☐ Director

Attn: Mr. W. A. BRANNIGAN
ROOM 834 9&D

Title OLEG ADOLFOVICH LYALIN
ESP-R

☐ SAC

☐ ASAC

☐ Supv.

☐ Agent

☐ SE

☐ IC

☐ CC

☐ Steno

☐ Clerk

☐ Rotor #:

ACTION DESIRED

☐ Acknowledge

☐ Assign Reassign

☐ Bring file

☐ Call me

☐ Correct

☐ Deadline

☐ Deadline passed

☐ Delinquent

☐ Discontinue

☐ Expedite

☐ File

☐ For information

☐ Handle

☐ Initial & return

☐ Leads need attention

☐ Return with explanation or notation as to action taken.

☐ Open Case

☐ Prepare lead cards

☐ Prepare tickler

☐ Return assignment card

☐ Return file

☐ Search and return

☐ See me

☐ Serial # 105-216642

☐ Post ☐ Recharge ☐ Return

☐ Send to

☐ Submit new charges

☐ Submit report

☐ Type

We can't spare the time at the moment to
clip and mount the attached articles. They
are being sent to you for info and mounting.
If needed, ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

ENCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE
See reverse side

SAC John T. Winnich

Office Legat London

59 OCT 21 1971

GPO: 1970 O-371-917

ESPIONAGE

Ron bulldozes his way out of a parking fine

MOTORIST Ron Burgess won a battle with a traffic warden yesterday—with the help of a giant bulldozer.

He drove it into the middle of a city street where he had just collected a parking ticket, jumped out and said: "Let's see you tow that away!"

Then he went back to his work as a demolition contractor, leaving the traffic in St. Mary's-row, Birmingham, jammed solid.

He told the police that the bulldozer would stay there until the £2 ticket on his car was cancelled. Half an

By WILLIAM DANIELS

hour later the battle was over.

Mr. Burgess drove the bulldozer back to a nearby demolition site and announced: "I have won. They have promised to cancel my ticket."

Blockade

"He set up his one-man blockade because a warden threatened to have his car towed away from the street after another warden had told him he could park it there."

Mr. Burgess, of Fourth-drive, Chelmsley Wood, near Birmingham, said: "Someone came to see me while I was driving my bulldozer and told me I was getting a

ticket. I rushed round to my car and found four wardens there. One was just putting the ticket on my windscreen.

"They seemed to treat it as a joke, and when one of them threatened to have the car towed away I lost my temper."

Only one vehicle got through his blockade—a car taking a woman home from hospital.

Mr. Burgess lifted the shovel of his machine so that it could drive underneath.

A city police spokesman said after the victory: "The police have power to withdraw fixed penalty tickets if they consider there are sufficient mitigating circumstances."

And, as Mr. Burgess knows, a bulldozer can make a pretty convincing argument.

GENTLE KATE BEATS UP A SNATCH-THIEF

SCHOOLGIRL Kate Alexander is normally bashful and not at all tough. But a thief really copped it the day she was roused to anger.

Fourteen-year-old Kate saw red when she spotted a youth trying to snatch a woman's bag. She dropped her school satchel, ran over to the youth and started punching him. And she held on to him until a policeman arrived.

WHEN THE CHIPS ARE DOWN...

Angry residents protested over loose chippings on their footpaths in Castle-road, Southampton, by dumping a bucketful in their councillor's office.

Within minutes, a council team set out to clean up the paths.

Now the Metropolitan Police have given Kate a gold watch as a reward for her bravery.

Kate, of Stevenage-road, East Ham, London, said: "When I heard the lady screaming I had to do something."

"I told my friends to get the police and just laid into the youth with my fists. I think I landed a few good punches."

Kate, whose arm was injured in the struggle, added: "I don't know where I got the courage from. I just seemed to see red."

Hello students! Now here's how you get drugs

THE HANDBOOK issued to new university students is packed with interesting information. It tells them where to eat, where to drink... and how to get drugs. It also warns 2,000 new students at Birmingham's Polytechnic and Aston University to watch out for marks.

Aston University's Joint Guild of Students, who gave the booklet's editors a free hand in its preparation, said yesterday: "The executive regrets the inclusion of drugs."

Nicky makes Antarctic men lose their cool

In the frozen
of Antarctica,
ares are rising

because of the
charms of 23.
Nicky Austin.
melted the
the stoical
manning the
Antarctic Survey
Port Stanley,

In the Falkland Islands.

They lost their cool over Nicky when they found her picture in a copy of a magazine called Amateur Photographer.

Suddenly they realised there were better things

in life than ice, snow and sea elephants.

Now they have sent an SOS back home to Britain: "Please send us more pictures of Nicky."

She was, they said, their "five-star, grade A dolly-bird of the first

water." No sooner said than done. Well, almost. Communications with Antarctica being what they are, it will take some time.

But as this picture of Nicky taken in London yesterday shows, she's the kind of girl who'll keep... on ice or anywhere else.

Bill - just to brighten your life

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This craft hi-fi a 30 hour in a very good The 202 will appear must Sep call radi in a cov apd Ye and wil

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The new Ma from mi ear Y and



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Nicky Austin . . . sending temperatures up: Picture by KENT GAVIN base a

THE GREAT RUSSIAN SPY SCANDAL

IRINA

The beautiful blonde who fell for a spy

THE beautiful blonde who loves the Russian defector had to face the decision of her life.

Should she return to Russia—and her husband? Or should she stay in Britain with her lover?

Mrs. Irina Teplyakova chose happiness. She decided that her place was here with Oleg Lialine, the KGB mystery man who is said to have helped to spark off Britain's shock expulsion of 105 Russians.

Hiding

And last night the lovers were in hiding at a house loaned to them by the British Secret Service.

Lialine, 34, and 30-year-old Irina became lovers when he joined the Soviet Trade Delegation in London.

She became his secretary. They worked together. And soon this

By NICK DAVIES and MARK DOWDNEY

"stunningly beautiful woman with a husky Russian voice" was Lialine's constant companion at West End clubs and restaurants.

A young Russian woman who used to work with Irina at the Soviet Trade Delegation in Highgate yesterday talked of the love affair... and of the fateful decision Irina alone could make.

The woman—she is blonde, about twenty-six and lives in a flat in Highgate's "Little Moscow"—said: "It must have been very difficult for her."

"She would have had to decide overnight whether to stay here in Britain with Oleg—or go back."

"I wish she had spoken to me about it, but she didn't."

The woman went on: "I knew

both Irina and Oleg quite well. "Irina was a tall, good-looking, handsome woman and it was very awkward for her because, of course, she is married."

She added: "I never met her husband, but I understand he has gone back home."

"Irina talked to me of the affair she was having, but she never told me that it was Oleg—though, of course, I knew only too well."


Children

"I don't know whether she had any children in Russia, but she didn't have any in England."

"They were never outrageous together in the office but I and the other girls knew what was happening."

A young Russian official said: "Irina is really beautiful."

OLEG



Six questions in a fantastic power puzzle

SIX puzzling questions hold the key to the great spy mystery which has turned into one of Britain's most astonishing episodes in recent

The man who was Russia's Mr Fixit

By ROGER TODD and RONALD RICKETTS

OLEG the spy was a man of many talents.

He was the Russians' Mr. Fixit—equally at home in the business world and on the cocktail circuit. Oleg Lialine had a sharp eye for a good business deal and a way with women.

And his biggest coup as a Russian trade delegate appears to have successfully combined aspects of both these interests.

It had to do with the price of fairs. They sell here for 200 a pair. In Moscow the price is £4.

Lialine set up a deal for shipping fairs worth £250,000 in Britain to Russia.

He was active in other areas of business. He helped in negotiations with firms wanting to sell to Russia.

He sorted out shipping problems and booked hotel rooms and

suites for visiting Russian buyers.

And there was still time to mix business with pleasure.

Lialine was often seen in the company of pretty girls.

One girl who knew him was 20-year-old blonde Susan Woodthorpe, of High Cross, Tottenham.

They met while Susan was working as a receptionist at the Regent-street offices of the Russian import-export agency Razno.

Susan said last night: "I thought he was very attractive. He was a real charmer."

She added: "We used to go for drinks at lunchtimes and sometimes after work. He always treated me very respectfully."

Lialine was known as a tireless party-goer.

He was identified by Lord Kilbracken as one of the swinging Russians who turned up at a New Year's Eve party given by the peer.



PHILBY He hits out at 'meddling'

THE Russians' master spy,

Kim Philby, who fled to Moscow in 1963, yesterday accused Britain of deliberately damaging East-West relations.

He said that Whitehall's purge of Soviet spies was aimed at slowing the thaw between Russia and Europe.

And Philby, pictured above, claimed in the government newspaper, *Izvestia*, that

British intelligence had meddled in West German politics.

Their aim, he said, had been to complicate the position of Chancellor Willy Brandt's government and discredit its leaders.

Sixty-one-year-old Philby deceived his colleagues in British Intelligence for more than ten years

foreign relations.

The answers lie somewhere between two extreme views of the drama—as a triumph for British security services, or a tangled game of bluff and counter-bluff between Whitehall and the Kremlin.

By GORDON JEFFERY
Mirror Foreign Editor

The questions now being privately asked in top political and official circles are:

1—Is Russian defector Oleg Lialine really the master spy that the British authorities claim?

If he is really a top KGB man, Whitehall's version of the defection suggests that he was an amazingly clumsy operator.

Oleg is said to have decided to "go over" when he was released on bail on a drink-driving charge.

2—If he is a KGB man, would his masters have allowed him to remain in London and risk disclosure of his undercover activities?

Reason

Or did they and Oleg contrive the incident to plant him on Britain?

3—Why did Britain use Oleg's reported disclosures as a reason to expel 105 Russian diplomats

and officials—when their clandestine activities were already well known to the security services?

One theory is that his defection coincided with a decision to purge the Russians to show Government toughness—for domestic, as much as international, reasons.

4—Why did the Russians make a surprise reversal of their usual practice by themselves providing the clue to Oleg's identity?

5—Why did Whitehall reveal Oleg's defection and the spy purge with an unprecedented and carefully-prepared publicity display?

6—Why have the Russians so far held their hand over reprisals when in the past they would be expected to hit back within hours?

A possible explanation is that they badly underestimated Britain's reaction.

FOOD BILL IS DOWN 5p

SPECIAL offers on coffee and Oxo cubes cut our shopping bill by a welcome 5p this weekend.

The saving took the Mirror Shopping Clock down to £3.31.

This shows that the same basket of groceries which cost £3 when our

prices survey began eleven months ago, now costs 51p more.

The special offers, both temporary "super savers" at Sainsburys, one of the shops we visit were:

A 4oz. jar of Maxwell House coffee down 3p to 24p, and a packet of 12 red Oxo cubes cut by 2p to

10p. There were no price changes on any of the other items on our special survey shopping list—so altogether we saved 5p.

Saved, did I say? Well, not quite. Because our two separate "his 'n' hers"

price surveys cost us a total of 5p more this weekend—which cancelled out the grocery saving.

The Men's List, which covers petrol, fares, cigarettes, beer and shaving kit, went up 1p to 5.46p because a tube of Colgate Lather shaving cream cost us 19p, 1p extra.


The Toiletries list,

which includes toiletry and medical items and make-up, went up 4p to £5.44p. That's because the cost of our Max Factor Pan-Cake make-up has gone up again to 39p.

Both these lists started off at £5.

The Grocer trade magazine this week lists 206 new price increases—taking the total recorded to 5,327 so far this year.

By SALLY MOORE



Sunny spells.
Lighting-up time;
7.12 p.m.
Details—Back Page.

Evening Standard

45,796

London: Thursday September 30 1971

5

3p



SUPER SPY OLEG MISSES COURT, STAYS IN HIDING

Russia
plans to
expel
20
Britons

Standard Reporter
MOSCOW, Thursday.
THE Soviet Union is pre-

By ROBERT CARVEL

CONFIRMATION that the Russian KGB defector behind the great London spy purge is the 34-year-old Soviet trade official Oleg Lialine came dramatically from several quarters today.

First there was an odd affair at Marlborough Street Court where Lialine was due to appear on a drink driving charge.

Scotland Yard had de-

clared: "It is a straight-

The Express
trail that

GLC get
warning
over
jobs

By JAMES IRVINE

HUNDREDS of men working on the £400 million Thames-mead housing project will

Weller
goes for
£100,000

CHelsea forward Keith Weller was today transferred to Leicester for £100,000.

Peter Blackman—Back Page
Son pays £100,000 to free father

Londoner found
battered to death

Page 6

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1971

135, FLEET STREET, LONDON, E.C.4.

TEL: 01-353 4242. TELEX: 22874/5/6.

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KIM'S GAME

IT WAS ONLY TO BE EXPECTED that, sooner or later, Moscow would wheel out the ageing KIM PHILBY to speak his piece about the affair of the British Government's banning of 105 Russian agents. *Izvestia* prints an "interview" with him (a "scoop"?), in which he says Britain's action has been entirely designed "in order to slow down the process of relaxation of tension in Europe." He alleges that it is particularly directed against Herr BRANDT, the West German Chancellor, and claims to have knowledge that Britain was undermining Herr BRANDT as long as 10 years ago when he was Mayor of Berlin. PHILBY's views (hardly surprisingly) are entirely in line with what has been official Soviet reaction to the affair right from the start. This has been to play down the practical importance of the expulsions while at the same time using them as a stick with which to beat British Tories over the head for dragging their feet on détente.

Modified versions of this line have been expounded by Mr CROSSMAN, Mr HEALEY and Mrs CASTLE, and more may be heard of it at the Labour party's conference in Brighton next week. Of course, the Government's action in expelling the Russians is "political" in the sense that any major event between separate Powers takes place in a political framework. What is that framework in this case? First and foremost it is a situation in which, as Mr HEATH said in a speech last week, the smaller countries of Europe need to "counter the overwhelming influence of the Soviet Union." One good, if minor, way to counter that influence is to cut down to size grossly inflated Soviet staffs which are used for wholesale spying and snooping; another, which seems imminent here, is to run in all their wretched non-Russian agents and saboteurs. If Mr HEALEY really thinks all this is done to encourage a "Red Scare," one can only say it is a good thing he is no longer Defence Minister: what a man to be in charge of our radar screen!

Of course, too, a decisive act such as Britain has taken over the Russian staffs has political repercussions. It would be against nature if it did not. In this case one repercussion, it is greatly to be hoped, will be to inject a cooling element of realism into the muzzy debate about "European security." Mr BREZHNEV's great campaign to soften up every non-Communist European country in sight, and in particular West Germany, has one principal aim: to hasten America's withdrawal across the Atlantic. He has been making good progress with a compliant Herr BRANDT. It is no bad thing that at this time London should remind our allies what they are dealing with.

VICTORY AT MACCLESFIELD

WHEN A RECENTLY ELECTED Government, which has deliberately taken some stern and some unpopular measures, wins a by-election, it may well congratulate itself. This is what has just happened at Macclesfield. No matter that a 10,000 majority has been decimated. No matter that the swing from the Government to the Opposition is estimated at 8.4 per cent. All this and worse might well

Japan and her ne

FRANCIS K
to Britain by E

SOMEWHERE in the course of "The Chrysanthemum and the Sword"—one of the most penetrating and perceptive books ever written by a foreigner about an alien culture—Ruth Benedict remarks that the Japanese can only be described in the most fantastic series of "but also's" that have ever been used for any nation of the world.

Of what other countries, she asks, would one say that they were unprecedentedly polite and then add "but also insolent and overbearing"; or that they are rigid in their behaviour and conservative in their beliefs and add "but also ready to adapt themselves to extreme innovations"?

People often use the word "schizophrenia" when attempting to explain these extraordinary contradictions. Everyone in Japan, one sometimes feels, is not merely himself but his opposite.

If I ever asked students the way, in most cases with incredible kindness they would guide me to my destination. Yet when Harold Nicolson and his wife, Vita Sackville-West, were visiting Japan on a garden-tour, these same students—or students like them—would invariably allow this elderly and infirm couple to stand on crowded trains while they themselves sat.

Many of my own male students would devote themselves to some aesthetic cult like that of flower-arrangement or the tea-ceremony with a feminine daintiness and delicacy; yet these same boys might also be players of American football or exponents of a brutal martial sport like karate.

Japanese commercial and industrial expansion in the last decade has often been ascribed to a willingness to submit to authority: the company or factory stands in the position of a severe, exacting but benevolent father, whose commands must be obeyed if the whole family is to prosper. Yet Japanese protests against revision of the Security Pact with the United States a decade ago and against the building of a new international airport near Tokyo today exceed in their anarchic violence anything that we have ever known of the kind in this country.

Again, Japanese courage and stoicism under extremes of hardship, pain or danger have become bywords throughout the world. Yet, during a typhoon, when sheets of corrugated iron, wrenched off roofs, were whizzing across the street in Kyoto, I saw men pushing women and even children aside to get to shelter quickly, in a scene of the most undignified panic that I have ever witnessed.

What is true about the Japanese people is also true about their country: everywhere there is contradiction. Travel by boat on the Inland Sea and even the beauties of the Aegean seem to be eclipsed; wander through a back-street of

Kyoto or Nara, as crowded temples and shrines as the Road with boutiques, and yourself if this is not a city richer in architectural and glories than Florence or Rome drive in from Haneda Airport the centre of Tokyo and yet be convinced that you have in an ante-room to hell.

The sprawling and smoke-conurbation that is Kyoto-Kobe—a 19th-century shanty afficted with elephantiasis—lutes with remorseless life reverberates with remorse noise; but on the foothills of Hiei, nearer to the centre of than Ken Wood is to the centre of London, it is possible to walk hours without seeing a single or hearing a single sound than the song of birds or the of cicadas.

Even in the centre of the city the contradiction between frenzied bustle and repose, between crowding and solitude is extreme. The Japanese businessman finds his way—or is, literally, pushed by thugs employed for this purpose—on to the underground train propels his car, grudging inch inch, along narrow streets jammed with traffic. But once home slips into a kimono and finds peering looking out on to a garden which though no bigger than the patio of a bijou London house, manages to suggest both space and complete detachment from the buildings that hem it in on all sides.


The seriousness

As much as the contradictoriness—or schizophrenia—of the Japanese temperament, what is always seemed to me to differentiate the Japanese race from our own is their greater seriousness.

Seriousness can, of course, easily degenerate into solemnity; an solemnity can be comic. Certainly it is easy enough to laugh at Samuel Smiles aspects of "Japanese life; but a philosophy of "Life is real, life is earnest" is arguably preferable to the increasingly popular English one of "Life is unreal, life is frivolous."

The Japanese tend to pursue even seemingly unimportant aims with extraordinary seriousness. When an amateur women's basketball team trains for the Olympic Games by practising not merely in the evenings and at weekends but all day and every day, the company for which they work giving them freedom for this purpose, then this single-minded concentration of effort inevitably seems distasteful to us. But when one sees the perfectionism with which a maid in even the cheapest Japanese inn will clean a room

CHEVERTON WORKBOATS



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Cowes, Isle of Wight. Tel: Cowes 2371.

BIRTHS, CHRISTENINGS and IN MEMORIAM 75 per line. MARRIAGES, DEATHS and ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 41 per line (minimum 2 lines).

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01-353 2060.

Announcements can be received by telephone between 9 a.m. and 6.45 p.m. Monday to Friday, and Saturday between 9 a.m. and 12 noon and Sunday between 10 a.m. and 3 p.m.

BIRTHS

BEDFORD—On Sept. 28, 1971, at Birmingham Maternity Hospital, to SUZ (née Davidson) and DICK BEDFORD, a son (Richard John).

BLOMFIELD—On Sept. 30, to JOAN (née Gumpert) and CHRISTOPHER BLOMFIELD, a daughter (Clara).

BRADLEY—On Sept. 30 at the Louise Margaret Hospital, Atherholt, to JANEEY (née Foster) and ROGER BRADLEY, a daughter (Victoria), a sister for Jonathan and Mark.

BROOKS—On Wednesday, Sept. 29, to ELIZABETH (née Alder) and DOMING BROOKS, a son (Andrew Dominic), brother for Marcus.

CAMPBELL—On Sept. 30, 1971, to PHYLLIS (née May) and JOHN CAMPBELL, a son (Robert Clarke).

CANARD—On Sept. 30, in New Zealand, to EDDY (née Widdridge) and HUGH CANARD, a son.

DEMETRIADI—On Sept. 29, at Mount Atherholt, Grafton, to KATIA and MICHAEL DEMETRIADI, a daughter.

ELLIOTT—On Sept. 29, at Bethesda, Maryland, to JUNE (née Carlton) and DAVID ELLIOTT, a daughter (Phyllis Lucy), sister for Joanna, Katherine and Susan.

FERNIE—On Sept. 27, at St George's Hospital, S.W.1, to MARGARET (née Watson) and SIMON FERNIE, a son (Christopher Edmund).

FRENCH—On Sept. 21, to KAREN (née Drake) and COLIN FRENCH of Northwood, a daughter (Melanie Jade).

GLIDON—On Sept. 30, at Walker Doular Maternity Hospital, Bristol, to RITA (née Coughlin) and RICHARD GLIDON, a daughter (Amanda Elizabeth), sister for Deborah.

GOULD—On Sept. 30, 1971, at Hemmingson Hospital, to JANE (née Lamb) and EDWARD GOULD, a daughter (Kara Penelope).

GUNN—On Oct. 1, at Kent and Canterbury Hospital, to KATE (née Wragg) and NEIL GUNN, a daughter (Liam).

HANKS—On Sept. 30, 1971, at St Peter's, Orem, Utah, to SYLVIA (née Nevill) and DAVID HANKS, a daughter (Fiona).

HOLM—On Sept. 14, to ELIZABETH (née Williamson) and PETER HOLM, a daughter (Georgina Elizabeth Ann).

HOUSFIELD—On Sept. 30, at Epson District Hospital, to WENDY (née Kimbrell) and BRIAN HOUSFIELD, a daughter.

KING—On Sept. 28, 1971, at home, to JULIE (née Lister) and IAN KING, a daughter (Tara Georgina), a sister for Julian, Sharon and Oliver.

LANCASTER—On Sept. 28, to JUDITH (née McMichael) and ELIOTT LANCASTER, a daughter (Mary Judith), a sister for Michael, Peter and Anne.

LANGFORD—On Sept. 28, at Colchester, to SUSAN (née Ralph) and Lt DAVID LANGFORD, R.N.A., a daughter (Sarah Kate Nicholson), a sister for Simon.

LOYD-WILLIAMS—On Sept. 30, 1971, at St Martin's Hospital, Bath, to PEGGY (née Burham) and Dr ROBERT LOYD-WILLIAMS, twin sons (Matthew Robert and Andrew Jones), brothers for George and Edward.

MARTIN—On Sept. 30, to ROSIE (née Thornely) and JAMIE MARTIN, a son (Thomas Peter Cutack).

NOCCHI—On Sept. 28, 1971, at Guy's, to MARION (née Handa) and MASSIMO NOCCHI, a daughter (Constanza Iria).

RICHARDSON—On Oct. 1, to CAROL (née Dellow) and PHILIP RICHARDSON, a son (Duncan).

WHITEFOORD—On Sept. 27, to DIANA (née Broad) and EDMOND WHITEFOORD, of 21, Windermere Crescent, Looselagh Lane, Derriford, Plymouth, a daughter.

WILDE—On Sept. 28, at Midland, through General Hospital, to SARAH (née Connolly) and DAVID WILDE, a son (Nathaniel Patrick Christian), a brother for Crisna.

HUNT (Adoption)—By CHRISTINE (née Elms) and BRIAN HUNT, in Canada, a daughter (Bonnie Lynne), 2 years old today.

MARRIAGES

CHEESMAN-WALKER—On Sept. 25, 1971, at the Register Office in Berkeley, E. Yorks, ADRIAN JOHN CHEESMAN of London, to SANDRA WALKER, of North Newbold, Yorks.

DICKER-McBRIDE—On Sept. 25, at Newport, Pembrokeshire, ALASTAIR CAMPBELL, younger son of Mr and Mrs C. W. DICKER, of Winchester, to FELICITY ANN, daughter of the late Mr J. McBRIDE and of Mrs McBRIDE, of Newport, Pembrokeshire.

REID-REEVES—On Oct. 1, at St Mary's, Cadogan Street, S.W.3, DAVID HUGH LORIMER, son of the late Mr RONALD REID, F.R.C.S., of Colchester, Essex, and of Mrs Mary Reid, of Chipping Norton, to CHRISTINE MARY, daughter of Mr and Mrs BENJAMIN REEVES, of Colchester, Essex.

TAYLOR-CRANSTON—On Sept. 29, 1971, at the Crown Church, Dover, Kent, by Rev. V. Logan, B.D., Lieut.-Colonel R. L. BAKER CAMERON TAYLOR, R.E. (Retd.), to MARGARET ISABEL, only daughter of Mr and Mrs S. CRANSTON, Roseley, S. Mayfield Road, Laverham.

RUBY WEDDING

SMITH-CAYLESS—On Oct. 3, 1951, at St John's Church, Palmers Green, COLIN OLIVER SMITH to DOROTHY MURIEL CAYLESS. Now at Bexhill-on-Sea, Sussex.

GOLDEN WEDDINGS

BREWLEY-PRICE—On Oct. 3, 1921, at Chapel Royal, Savoy, WILLIAM FLEMING BREWLEY to OLIVE MARY PRICE. Present address: 1, Bexley Road, Bexley, Kent.

CALCUTT-YOUNG—On Oct. 3, 1921, at Old Shoreham Church, ALFRED HENRY CALCUTT to LINDA CHRISTINE YOUNG. Present address: 44, St. Ives Park, Ringwood, Hants.

DAY-MANN—On Oct. 2, 1921, at St Giles Church, London, FREDERICK JOHN JAMES DAY to MAY ALEXANDRA MARY, Brambling Towers Hotel, Bourne-mouth.

RUSSELL-PHILPOTTS—On Oct. 3, 1921, at the Baptist Church, Ilfracombe, LEWIS EDWARD RUSSELL to FRANCES MARY PHILPOTTS. Present address: Sunny Mede, Marazion, Sidmouth.

IN MEMORIAM

"THEIR NAME LIVETH FOR EVERMORE"
CASSY—In loving memory of our precious only son, MICHAEL, Lieut., Grenadier Guards, killed in action, Italy, Oct. 2, 1944, and of his father, DOUGLAS WILKINSON CASSY, Lieut., Grenadier Guards, who died Sept. 20, 1949, as the result of two wars.

HOLLAND—In ever-loving memory of my beloved husband, Oct. 2, 1916. RALPH HOLLAND, 70, 22, Royal West Kent, killed at Thiepval on Oct. 2, 1916. The path of duty was their way to glory.

DEATHS

ALMOND—On Sept. 30, peacefully at a Newbury nursing home, VIOLET WINDFELD ANGELE, aged 87, widow of Dr G. H. ALMOND of Bath, and beloved mother of John and Patrick. Cremation at Reading, 3 p.m., Oct. 6. Family flowers only.

ANSTEE—On Sept. 30, 1971, EDWARD CURTIS ANSTEE, aged 76 years, of Epping, Essex, Somerset, and formerly of Writtle, Essex, dearly loved husband of Annie Adaliza, whom he married devotedly, and beloved father of Margaret Joan. Private cremation at Weston-super-Mare on Monday, Oct. 4. No flowers, please, but donations to U.N.I.C.E.F., 14, Stratford Place, London, W.1.

BANKS—On Oct. 1, 1971, suddenly, at her home, 19, Canby Street, Hereford, WINIFRED MARY CATHERINE, daughter of the late Mr and Mrs GEORGE BANKS. Funeral service at Hereford Cathedral.

ULSTER DEFENCE REGIMENT TO HAVE 10,000 MEN

By Brig. W. F. K. THOMPSON, Military Correspondent

THE Defence Ministry is to concentrate its efforts on expanding the Ulster Defence Regiment, Lord Carrington, Defence Secretary, said yesterday in Northern Ireland.

Recruiting was going well, he said. The previous ceiling figure of 6,000 men in the regiment was recently lifted, and the Minister put the new target at 10,000, with further expansion later. Some military commanders speak of the need for 20,000.

RESIGNATION RUMOURS DISCOUNTED

By DAVID HARRIS
Political Staff

RUMOURS that Mr John Taylor, Minister of State, Home Affairs, at Stormont, is about to resign in protest at the handling of the security operation, were discounted last night by Ulster Government sources.

The speculation started after Mr Taylor, who is under some pressure from his border constituency of South Tyrone, had refused earlier in the day to meet Lord Carrington, Defence Secretary.

He was not available for comment, but apparently he thinks the whole Stormont Government should have been able to question Lord Carrington about the security drive.

Instead, only five Ministers were invited to the talks, held at the end of the Defence Secretary's two-day visit to Ulster.

Two new Bills

Two Bills will be brought in and put on the statute book probably within 48 hours because of the civil disobedience campaign.

One will give the Government power to deduct from social benefits any money being withheld by an individual in the rent and rates strike.

Lord Carrington made his announcement towards the end of a two-day visit to units in Londonderry and Belfast.

He was accompanied by Lt-Gen. Sir Harry Tuzo, GOC Northern Ireland, with whom he conferred on the situation before returning to London.

Lord Carrington said his visit had more firmly convinced him of the necessity for internment. The Army had interned 160 acknowledged gunmen and had arrested a further 80 since Aug. 9.

Army morale high

The Army's morale was high, its training excellent, and it was on the offensive. The L.R.A. was making greater use of automatic weapons and the Army would respond in kind.

Internment had brought the gunmen into the open. It had lanced a boil which, had this step not been taken, would have gone on growing under the surface until it burst and caused a far more serious security situation than was now the case.

He was firmly opposed to all forms of "third force," but particularly to any armed third force.

The key to the situation lay in improving the information and intelligence received by the security forces.

Anyone wanting to see the gunmen brought under control and the end of internment should co-operate with the security forces in providing intelligence which would enable them to act against the terrorists.

Closing roads

On the question of taking measures to close or obstruct some of the 260 crossing places along the frontier passable for cars, Lord Carrington said he had

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The Daily Telegraph

No. 36200. LONDON, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1971.

COLOUR MAGAZINE TODAY

FINAL

RISE IN DAMP
M
C
Rising damp in the UK. The following are the latest figures for the number of houses affected by rising damp in the UK. The figures are for the year ending 31st March 1971.

London	1,234
Manchester	1,567
Birmingham	1,890
Cardiff	2,123
Edinburgh	2,456
Glasgow	2,789
Leeds	3,123
Liverpool	3,456
Nottingham	3,789
Sheffield	4,123
Sunderland	4,456
Wolverhampton	4,789
Wrexham	5,123
Wylfa	5,456
Wylfa Newydd	5,789
Wylfa Old	6,123
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The Express reveals his name

SUPER SPY OLEG

Russian bailed
over B-test

A Russian trade delegate was ordered to stand trial in the Crown Court, London, yesterday for giving a car which was being driven and charged to take a bomb test.

Oleg Lialine, aged 34, of West Hill, Hammersmith, was remanded until September 29 for trial.

THE "GLASS" ONLY
EXPRESS, AUGUST 27

And we also
reveal the
secret behind
this MI5
picture of a
spy at work

By

ROY BLACKMAN, JAMES DAVIES

THE K.G.B. defector who sparked Britain's huge purge of Russian spies last week was revealed last night as Oleg Lialine. And it all happened, apparently, because he was accused of being drunk one night in London's Tottenham Court Road.

Lialine, aged 34, was an up-and-coming secret police officer disguised as a member of the Soviet trade mission. He is also said to have led another kind of double life by acquiring a fatal taste for Western high-jinks.

The astonishing story slipped out at the Soviet Embassy in Kensington Palace Gardens when a new official Vladimir Pavlov, was dealing with routine inquiries about the purge in which 105 Russian officials are being ordered not to return to the country.

The
KGB
man
who
talked
and



MAENSON
CLOTHES FOR MEN
Superbly made from
the finest cloths with immediate fit
at all the best shops and stores
MAENSON

The Daily Telegraph

FINAL

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No. 36201. LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1971.

Printed in LONDON and MANCHESTER

4p

Lyalin's secretary defects

KGB CONTACTS FACE CHARGES



Mr George Kuznetsov, information section chief at the Soviet Embassy, who says he is among the Russians being expelled.

Philby joins in Soviet attack

SEVERAL Britons are to face charges of spying for Russia following the defection of KGB agent Oleg Lyalin and the expulsion of 105 Russians from Britain.

The proposed prosecutions were disclosed yesterday by British sources at the United Nations in New York, says VINCENT RYDER, OUR DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT.

Some foreigners living in Britain will also be charged, but no Russians are likely to be accused. It is expected that some of the charges will concern Russian plans to sabotage British defence installations.

The Foreign Office revealed yesterday that Oleg Lyalin's Russian girl friend and former secretary, Mrs Irina Teplyakova, had defected with him. Mrs Teplyakova — described by a friend as "strikingly beautiful" — was with Lyalin at a British security hide-out in Surrey last night.

'RED SCARE' WORRY


Mr Denis Healey, Shadow Foreign Secretary, said in a radio interview that he was worried by the way the Government had encouraged the Press and the BBC to cover the spy purge as a "Red scare." He added: "I think it has been done for political reasons, to build up Mr Heath and cover up the Government's economic failures."

'Beautiful blonde' can stay

By DAVID FLOYD
Communist Affairs
Correspondent

MRS IRINA TEPLYAKOVA, 31, secretary and girlfriend of Oleg Lyalin, the Russian secret police officer granted asylum in Britain, has also defected.

Her request to stay in Britain and the decision to grant it were revealed in a statement by the Home Office yesterday. I understand that Mrs Teplyakova, a beautiful blonde, asked for asylum at the same time as Lyalin.



PICTURE: ROBERT BARCLAY

Miss Susan Woodthorpe, 30, who worked with Oleg Lyalin, 34, at the RAZN agency, pouring a drink for a customer at her father's public house, in Tottenham last night. Report—Back page.

IRA kill soldier as he guards children

By TONY CONYERS in Belfast

A SOLDIER of the 1st Bn, Green Howards, was shot dead yesterday by a terrorist in Belfast. He was in a patrol which was making sure children got safely

Labour Conference

UNIONS SNUB Mrs CASTLE

By JOHN RICHARDS
Industrial Staff

MRS CASTLE, former Secretary for Employment, will not make the key speech attacking Mr Carr's Industrial Relations Act at next week's Labour party conference in Brighton. Union chiefs claim she has "lost her credibility" as leading opponent of the new legislation.

Her future as Opposition Front Bench spokesman on industrial relations was thrown into doubt yesterday after a 15-4 vote by the party's National Executive to drop her from next Tuesday's debate.

Mrs Castle was absent when the matter was discussed, but Mr Wilson fought strongly on her behalf. He recalled that she had battled mightily after night during the Commons debates on Mr Carr's proposals.

But Mr Simpson (Engineering Union) and Mr Gormley (Mineworkers) who led the critics, were not to be dissuaded from thrusting the knife into old wounds. Mr Gormley said they could neither forgive nor forget last year's conference speech by Mrs Castle which was badly received by union delegates.

Eventually, Mr Simpson was chosen as the main executive speaker for the debate. He will answer demands for the repeal of the Act whenever a new Labour Government is elected.

Rostrum for Jenkins

An attempt to oust Mr Jenkins as spokesman on economic policy by Mrs Judith Hart, a leading Left-winger, and Mr Kitson (Transport Union) was defeated. An 11-9 majority decided to give the rostrum to two executive speakers in Wednesday's economic debate, so that Mrs Castle and the former Chancellor can take part.

In the Common Market debate on Monday Mr Healey and

Tories hold on to Macclesfield by 1,079 votes

By ROWLAND SUMMERSCALES, Political Staff

THE Government retained its hold on Macclesfield, in Thursday's crucial by-election, precariously by a majority of 1,079. The result was announced yesterday afternoon.

It is clear that Mr Nicholas Winterton held the seat for the Conservatives not because of any national popularity for the Government but because of the solidarity of Macclesfield's traditional vote and the scale and skill of the party's organisation.

The results (General Election figures in italics) was:

N. WINTERTON (C.) 24,933 29,023

Mrs D. JEUDE (Lab.) 23,854 18,571

R. M. HAMMOND 5,991 8,124

(Lib)

R. SIMMERSON 978 —

(Anti-Com. Mkt. C.)

R. GOODALL 92 —

(Eng. Nat. Resurgence)

C. maj. ... 1,079 10,452

No CHANGE.

The three candidates at the bottom of the poll all forfeited their deposit.

75 p.c. turn-out

Relieved Conservative party managers pointed to the size of the turn-out, a total poll of 75.3 per cent., only just over one per cent. lower than at the General Election, as the biggest factor in the Government's successful defence of this seat. The electorate is 74,154 (72,900 at the General Election).

This was clear evidence that, despite present adverse electoral conditions, the biggest part of the Conservative support in the constituency remained constant.

But the result nevertheless represents a swing of 8.4 per cent. to Labour, a fact regarded at Transport House as highly

Continued on Back P., Col. 3

Picture—P15

Editorial Comment—P14

STRIKES SHUT ALL U.S. PORTS

By MABEL ELLIOTT
in New York

THE United States yesterday experienced the first total shutdown of all her deep sea ports, as 45,000 dock workers from Maine to Texas went on strike. They join the West Coast members of the International Longshoremen's Association, who have been on strike since July 1.

The East Coast strike was called after negotiations between the union and New York shipowners for a guaranteed income broke down early yesterday.

The dispute is based on a decision by the shipowners to stop the practice whereby every dock worker is paid for 40 hours a week and 52 weeks a year, whether work is available or

THE CENTURY

caught before the great purge

SOROKIN THE GOOD FRIEND

DMITRY Ivanowitch Sorokin was a friendly spy who came to Britain in August 1967 as Second Secretary in the Soviet Consulate.

At the 1970 Farnborough Air Show he had a chance meeting with a Defence Ministry employee and offered him a lift to the station.

Interrupted

They met a number of times later for a meal, with Sorokin paying. A New Year present from Sorokin was followed by lots of questions.

Eventually the Ministry man was asked for a copy of an internal telephone directory — but he refused.

Sorokin tried to put on the

The case of comrade Tyukhin

LEONID Yakovlevich Tyukhin was no stranger to Britain when he arrived in October 1968 to join the scientific and technical department at the Soviet Embassy.

He was a post-graduate student at Birmingham University from 1968 to 1967. Tyukhin inherited a contact from a fellow KGB officer, and a number of meetings took place.

It was information about computers that Tyukhin was after and he went so far as to ask his contact to get a job in the Defence Ministry.

He promised ample funds to supplement the Civil Service salary. The contact wanted



Sir Alec's secret letter to Russia

FOLLOWING the decision to expel the Russians the Foreign Office has made public letters from Sir Alec Douglas-Home to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei

105-71-61

WEATHER:

mainly dry.

lighting-up time:

26 p.m.

Details—Back Page.

45,791

London: Friday September 24 1971

5

3p

CITY
PRICES

Evening Standard

TOP KGB SPY DEFECTS TO LONDON

By ROBERT CARVEL

A SENIOR Russian intelligence officer has sought sanctuary in London. Whitehall was tight-lipped about it at first today, but a guarded Foreign statement was likely to be authorised.

in comment on everywhere was the usual such situations.

£50,000 pay
day raid on
London store

The big
best
seller
in the
Standard

TOP of the best-seller lists in Britain is Alistair MacLean's new action-packed novel, *Bear Island*.

That's where Alistair MacLean usually gets. His publishers expect to sell 2,000,000 copies of his books in 1971.

So far about 23 million copies of MacLean novels have been sold, including translations into 17 languages.

Bear Island will keep up the trend. They expect to sell more than 100,000 hard-cover copies of this book by Christmas.

Now you can read it in the Evening Standard.

The first of 10 long, action-packed instalments will be published on Monday.

"This is MacLean back in the location he writes about best," says *The Times*. That location, of course, is the sea.

The *Times* adds: "Good edge-of-the-seat stuff."

Just what you'd expect from the author of *The*

GARDNERS TRANSFORMERS FOR ELECTRONICS
 AND REALLY LONG RUNS!
 COMPETITIVE TOO!
 Gardners

The Daily Telegraph

FINAL

No. 36195. LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1971.

Printed in LONDON and MANCHESTER

4p

WORKING AIR NEEDS
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KGB defector exposes Soviet spy net and sabotage plans. BRITAIN TO EXPEL 105 RUSSIANS



Mr Yuri Andropov, head of the KGB.



Mr Ivan Ippolitov, Soviet Charge d'Affaires.

SPY-MECCA

Moscow reprisal Concorde expected

By VINCENT RYDER, Diplomatic Correspondent

BRITAIN expelled 90 Russian diplomats and officials yesterday for spying, forbade the return of 15 others temporarily out of the country and put a limit on the number of officials the Soviet Government may station in London.

The drastic action came after the defection of a senior agent of the KGB intelligence service earlier this month and his disclosure of plans to infiltrate saboteurs and more spies into Britain.

The revelations of the agent—who has not been named—brought to the boil a major row that had been brewing in London for more than a year. London had become a hive of Russian intelligence activity, including efforts to get hold of military secrets and a mass of secret technical information, such as details of Concorde.

TWO-WEEK DEADLINE

Direct private complaints and appeals for restraint

Concorde secrets at risk

By Air Cdre E. M. Donaldson
 Air Correspondent

THE Russians have been showing an unusually keen interest in technical details of Concorde and its Rolls-Royce engines which have proved extremely reliable and effective in operation.

It is also known that Russia has been having some trouble with the development of the TU 144 supersonic airliner.

When I met Mr. Tupolev, designer of the TU 144 at this year's Paris Air Show, I was surprised to learn how far the Russian plane still had to go in its trials before it would be ready for service.

The Russians, until then, had claimed the TU 144 a year or two in advance of Concorde in her development. Yet Mr. Tupolev told me that Russia had only one supersonic plane flying at that time whereas Britain and France had two Concorde flying with a third about to take to the air soon.

Britain's Aide Memoire, Sir Alec's Letters and Picture
 —P15; Highgate Spies—



A police guard outside the Intourist and Aeroflot offices in Regent Street yesterday.

PICTURE: ANTHONY MARSHALL

Painting stolen from Queen's collection

By T. A. SANDROCK, Crime Correspondent

China's disgraced president escapes

By CLARE HOLLINGWORTH
 in Hongkong

CHINA'S disgraced former President, Liu Shao-chi deposed during the Cultural Revolution, has escaped from house arrest in Peking.

According to the latest reports from Canton, he was assisted by the Army Chief of Staff, General Huang Yung sheng, who is now being questioned.

As soon as it was known on Sept. 12 that Liu was missing from his rooms in the heavily guarded west wing of the Chung Nam Hoi (a rambling Peking palace in whose east wing Chairman Mao and his wife Chiang Ching live), all civil and military aircraft were grounded in an effort to prevent him fleeing the country.

Unlikely allies

The present bitter struggle for power in Peking is causing apparently unlikely people to become allied.

No partnership is more bizarre than that between Liu, who has been officially termed "a scab" and "the man who attempted to imitate the Soviet Union policies initiated by Khrushchev," and General Huang, who rose during the Cultural Revolution from a provincial army commander to Chief of the General Staff.

The radical general is known to have been attempting to assume increasing power in the defence forces at the expense of the more moderate Marshal Lin Biao, Mao's chosen successor, who has not been seen in public in recent weeks.

Chou En-lai's appearance at Peking airport on Thursday last, when he was merely greeting

Nasser's secret eye on Britain

PRESIDENT NASSER'S intelligence on British

DAILY EXPRESS



No. 22,173

SATURDAY OCTOBER 2 1971

Weather: Sunny, d

Price 3p

It's
sensational,
says Sir Max



Our aim
is
always
to give
the
news

SIR MAX AITKEN

OLEG RISKS LIFE FOR LOVE!

How he
persuaded
beautiful
Irena
to defect
with him

By ROY BLACKMAN
JAMES DAVIES, JAMES

105-016642

Daily



SATURDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1971

Mail

3p

ROB
4-1 NA
-Page 27

More spy sensations to come
-OFFICIAL

'ARREST THE LOT' ORDER

**THE Government
has taken a firm
decision to arrest
all agents working
for Soviet espionage**


**By PETER BURDEN
Chief Crime Reporter**

debuting of KGB defector Oleg Lyalin.
The Government feels the trials will
demonstrate clearly to the British public
and the world the astonishing scale of
Russian espionage activities here.

might have gone if allowed to stay.
Elaborate Russian plans to knock out
key British defence bases will be brought
into public scrutiny in greater detail than
ever before.


But parts of the trials are likely to be
held behind closed doors. The prosecution
probably will not want to reveal
which bases the Russians considered
their prime targets.

The most sensational revelation may be



105-21642

CHELSEA HIT THIRTEEN See Back Page




FORWARD WITH THE PEOPLE 3p Thursday, September 30, 1971

MASTER

SPY REVEALED

**Named: The man behind the
great purge**



DAILY EXPRESS

No. 22,174

MONDAY OCTOBER 4 1971

Weather: Sunny spells, showers; warm

Price 3p




Russians sail home

SPIES

**PHOTO
NEWS**

Farewell,
England
Page 7


AWEIGH!



At the stern: Hammer and sickle

By
JAMES DAVIES

RUSSIA'S spies went home yesterday — by school bus and an ageing cruise ship due for the breakers' yard.



105-0-067

**THE
Sun**

Defector puts finger on Russia's secret army

FORWARD WITH THE PEOPLE 3p

Saturday, September 25, 1971

IT'S ALL
GO!
IN THE
NON-STOP
SUN NEXT
WEEK

*The girl
that
I marry*

● PETE MURRAY
couldn't bear a wife who
left the dishes in the
sink overnight.

● Photographed by LORD

BRITAIN KICKS OUT

DAILY Mirror

BRITAIN'S BIGGEST DAILY SALE

Saturday, October 2, 1971

No. 21,066

105-2 (66) 12

NEXT WEEK IN YOUR BEST-OF-EVERYTHING MIRROR

THE BEST OF BRITISH LOVE

WHERE do the flames of love
burn fiercest... among Lon-
don Lads or Manchester Men;
Cornish Casanovas or South
Wales Swains? See how your
men rate.



THE TRUTH ABOUT EXERCISE

HOW valuable is
it in the weight
reducing game?
A SLIMMERS'
CLUB special.

The Night People

WHILE you sleep
they work? But
how does it affect
their lives?

Who's crazy

NEW SPIES SENSATION

MAIL DOSSIER ON THE GREAT SPY SCANDAL: 2/THE AFFAIR OF OLEG AND IRINA

Soviet traders disown Oleg

By DOUGLAS THOMPSON

RAZNO, the Soviet trading agency in Regent Street, yesterday broke its silence to disown defected KGB spy Oleg Lyalin as an employee.

Mr David Winter, the firm's solicitor and secretary, made a statement to clarify the relationship.

Mr Lev Tjurdeney, Razno's deputy managing director, was with Mr Winter in a plush office in the firm's fourth storey suite.

Mr Winter said: "The company was established to promote and develop trade between the UK and the Soviet Union."

"It has been involved in the negotiation of exports to the Soviet Union of ladies' and men's clothing, ladies' and men's shoes, to a value exceeding £7 million."

"As to Mr Oleg Lyalin, he is not and has never been on the staff of the company, but up to some two or three months ago he sometimes gave assistance in connection with business negotiations

Call it Love, call it Sex... it's the one ingredient they cannot plan for...

IRINA TEPLYAKOVA will not be much more than an afterthought in the index of history. But this unremarkable 31-year-old woman, ordinarily efficient at shorthand and typing, symbolises the one element in the human personality that defies all the efforts of man to command the will of others.

Loyalty can be bought. Patriotism can be bred. Ideology can be instilled. But in the all-artful designs of the twilight world of espionage, the elemental need of a man for a woman is the one recurring incalculable.

Minds can be processed but not all the guile, coercion or blandishments of a Kremlin or a Pentagon can discipline the unpre-

dictable chemistry of the emotions.

By all the standards of his devious trade Oleg Lyalin was an exceptionally good and committed spy, promoted because of his impressive past and unquestioned loyalty to the top echelons of the Russian espionage network.

Then, simply, he fell in love with his secretary, a married woman, became vulnerable to scandal and the wrath of his masters and defected with his briefcase full of secrets.

Compromise

The commissars of spy selection—KGB, CIA and the agencies of every other flag—try to insure against development of liaison compromising to the necessarily furtive business of espionage by picking agents

BY PETER GREIG

with "safe" marriages or love sex drives. But, paradoxically, the very nature of the work—the isolation, the danger, the unrelenting tension on the nerves—increases the need for companionship, solace and emotional outlets.

Subversion of the spy by sex and injudicious love is a consistent theme in the history of espionage.

Classically, like Lyalin, Eugene Ivanov, a Soviet agent camouflaged as a naval attaché in the London Embassy, was enticed by the social pleasures, one of whom was Christine Keeler, sparked the Profumo scandal and was recalled in disgrace.

James Mitchell, the creator of television's "The

and a student of espionage, says:

"Obviously the best spy would be a robot, but you cannot have a eunuch. A man with no sex drive has no drive at all."

The loneliness of the spy's job is an important factor. Put a man in isolation for a long period and he is likely to become vulnerable.

Dangerous

You can subject a person to as many psychological tests as you like and he may emerge as totally balanced, but you can never eliminate the human factor. There is always the chance that he will meet a girl and fall in love. That's when it's dangerous.

Although James Bond was a parody, in one respect he truly reflected a characteristic of his profession—the need for emotional and physical release through sexual liaison.

Philby, have appetites.

This is son trollers under mit. Cold, cl strings is no gerous.

But, ironic when trends gists, are try society that ca sex is more h natural than a cept of roman trained to live has so wildly ingly rejected s

It was not s Oleg Lyalin to d love.

For there is n that can erase th patterns of hum and no spyma legislate for love

Daily men c fall for their It is a cliché o

Scarcely ever simple, convent rence have the global drama

DO OUR CHILDREN GET ENOUGH TO EAT?

SEE CENTRE PAGES

Judge slams unwed star mums

By LESLIE HINTON
AMOUS unmarried mums got a rocket last night from Lord Denning, one of Britain's most senior judges.

There are women who, in a kind of bravado, seem ready to parade their unchastity for all to see," said the 72-year-old Master of the Rolls.

They announce they are pregnant. They hold a Press conference for the purpose. They decline to name the father. I cannot believe that they are really happy about it.

Names

Every woman must know that if a child is to be well brought up, it should have a father as well as a mother.

Lord Denning did not name names. But he was clearly thinking of actresses like Vanessa Redgrave, Adrienne Corri and Jane Birkin, and MP Bernadette Devlin.

I told a marriage guidance meeting at Nottingham: "Promiscuity before or after marriage is an evil thing.

I am evil to those who indulge in it. It is destructive of family life. It is altogether to be deplored."

Strain

I sex before marriage, he said: "Once experienced, then there is nothing to lose. It is easy to do it again and the girl becomes 'easy'."

I had this advice for young couples planning marriage: "Don't have long engagements — they put too great a strain on the couple."

They should marry soon, he said — even if they are quite young.

STORM OVER SPY FILM BLUNDER



Oleg Lialine... an artist's sketch.

OLEG... AS A GIRL FRIEND SAW HIM

A LONDON girl friend of Soviet super-spy Oleg Lialine talked about him last night.

And from her description of him an ITN artist drew this sketch of the man who defected and started Britain's Great Spy Purge.

The girl, who was unnamed, told interviewer Ivor Mills that Lialine was "tall, good-looking and nicely proportioned."

Charming

She thought he was very attractive to women and had a "quiet, charming" personality.

Was he always serious? The girl said: "He wasn't serious all the time, but he wasn't a half-fellow-well-met sort of person. I would say he was more serious than otherwise."

Mills asked: "Would you describe him as a playboy, in any sense a

Casanova?" The girl replied: "Not as far as I knew him, certainly not."

Asked about her relationship with Lialine, she said: "I dealt with hotel bookings for him, for his job in the trade delegation."

Her reaction to his defection? "I couldn't believe it... I was just so surprised."

Last night 34-year-old Lialine was at a secret address in London. He was believed to be with a woman who was his go-between with British Intelligence.

Lialine's wife and seven-year-old son are in Moscow. The KGB — the Russian secret police force to which he belonged — still think they might lure him back to Russia by playing on his family affection.

By ANTHONY SHRIMSLEY, Political Editor

A TOP-LEVEL decision to "leak" a secret film to the BBC has started a political storm.

The film, seen on TV last night, showed Vladislav Drozdov, former Third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in London, collecting information from a "dead letter box."

After nearly 24 hours of Whitehall claims to know nothing about the film, the Home Office finally confirmed it had been handed over to the BBC on official authority.

The publication of photographs from the film was part of a massive propaganda operation.

The operation began on Friday with the announcement that 105 Soviet diplomats in Britain were being expelled as spies.

Yesterday the Foreign Office confirmed that the KGB (secret police) man who named the officials was 34-year-old defector Oleg Lialine.

And at that stage there

Now Home Office admits BBC leak

were signs that the publicity campaign had got seriously out of hand. There were suggestions among diplomats of a split between "hard" and "soft" factions in the Foreign Office — and of British Intelligence winning a key political battle over the diplomatic service.

QUESTIONS

On Wednesday night the Foreign Office claimed, in an on-the-record statement, to have no knowledge of the "spy" film.

They stuck to this line yesterday even when the Home Office announced that the BBC had been given some film and two stills dating from 1968.

These were said to be from a training film which has been widely shown to civil servants.

Yesterday two questions were being asked at Westminster:

Who gave the order to release the film?

Has someone blundered?

Leading Labour MPs were talking of attempts to manipulate news and TV reaction to the drama. One bland explanation of the film affair yesterday was that the BBC had asked for material some time ago and it had been decided to supply parts of the "training" film.

Requests by the Sun to other Government departments last night for any other material on slides which might be available met with complete bewilderment.

The Government's handling of the spy epic has now become a subject of dispute between the major parties.

TACTICS

Shadow Foreign Secretary Denis Healey plans to attack the Government's tactics in a speech to the Labour Party conference next week.

He sees it as an attempt to undermine proposals for the European security conference which the Labour Party supports.

ITV also screened the controversial spy film last night. An ITN spokesman said: "We got it from official sources — the same sources as the BBC."

The day Oleg was arrested — Pages 4 and 5


Dear Marje
YOU WRITE,
PROOFS ANSWERS
Page 13

THE GREAT Mrs BRITAIN LINE-UP



SIX WINNERS FOR NEWSBOY
Racing Mirror,
Pages 28 & 29

PLUS—50 colour TV sets to be won! Page 23



Face of a spy

This is spy Oleg—an Identikit picture built up from a woman's friend's description for ITN.

IS OLEG A PHONEY?



SWEETHEARTS IN LOVE TANGLE

THE course of love is not running smoothly for this sad couple. They have already had to call off their wedding and cancel a Continental honeymoon. And that, really, is only the start of their nightmare. The trouble is that

merchant seaman Adrian Wells, pictured with his fiancée Christine Samuel, has been married before. And his wife was granted a divorce in 1969—in Rhodesia. Rhodesian divorces are not recognised by the British Government. And

a divorce in Britain would take six months, by which time Christine's visitor's permit would have long expired. She is from New Zealand. In any case, Adrian said yesterday that he couldn't afford £200 for divorce proceedings

because although the Government say he is married, they tax him as a single man. And Christine, aged 26, couldn't pay. She spent her savings of £700 on the trip to Britain. Adrian, 26, of Enys-road, Camberne, Corn-

By GORDON JEFFERY, Mirror Foreign Editor

A DRAMATIC question mark hung over Russian KGB man Oleg Lialine last night: Did he really defect to Britain—or was he planted?

This was the Great Spy-Puzzle perplexing top Government and Whitehall circles.

The mysterious Oleg is understood to be one of at least three Russians, all claiming to be top KGB men, who have "gone over" to Britain in the last four years. None of the others has been named.

Although counter-espionage chiefs are presumably confident about Lialine's case, there are misgivings in some influential circles.

The way in which his name was revealed has added to the doubts.

It came in a massive clue said to have been dropped by a senior Soviet diplomat. He mentioned reports of 34-year-old Lialine's arrest in London on a drunk driving charge.

The diplomat, who arrived only recently, in

The big fear: He may have been planted

London, would not normally be expected to discuss the spy scandal, let alone hint at names, unless he was acting on orders from Moscow.

This is the first time that a defector of Lialine's reported importance has been voluntarily identified by the Russians.

Suspensions that Lialine could be a phoney have been boosted by other puzzling features.

Unlikely

If he is a top KGB man, it is debatable whether he would have endangered his cover by driving drunk through Soho.

Lialine, a trade delegate who was not covered by diplomatic immunity, is unlikely to have stayed in Britain after being released on bail.

KGB chiefs in Moscow

would have been extremely reluctant to allow one of their master spies to take a chance on bluffing the police.

There have been official hints that Lialine put the finger on Russian spies operating in London—and helped to spark off Britain's shock expulsion of 105 Russians.

But, it is being argued, the Russians have known for at least two years that they risked a massive purge.

Now the big question is being asked: Were the expelled Russians regarded by Moscow as expendable—and did at least some of them operate deliberately in a clumsy way to draw the security authorities?

The KGB could have

Continued on Back Page

wall said: "My situation is just unbelievable." Christine said: "We are pawns in an international political argument."

Story by JOHN JACKSON and DOUGLAS SLIGHT. Picture by DOREEN SPOONER.

elopment of Anglo-Soviet relations

Threat to European Security Conference, says Foreign Office

RUSSIA was reminded by Britain yesterday that the scale of her intelligence operations in Britain is in marked contrast to the Kremlin's determined diplomatic attempts to arrange a European security conference.

Whitehall wants an end to this contradiction before preparations for the conference begin; the Government pointed out in its announcement that 105 Soviet officials are being expelled.

The hint was given in an aide-memoire handed to Mr Ivan Ippolito, Soviet chargé d'affaires, when he was called in yesterday by Sir Denis Greenhill, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office.

Its full text: When Mr Gromyko visited London in October, 1970, he spoke of the desirability of improving Anglo-Soviet relations. It is the sincere wish of Her Majesty's Government to bring about such an improvement.

There is, however, one matter of importance which has repeatedly caused friction in Anglo-Soviet relations. This is the scale of intelligence gathering activities by Soviet officials in this country.

This subject was raised with Mr Gromyko by Sir Alec Douglas-Home, first in conversation in London and subsequently in a letter dated 3rd December, 1970, written at Mr Gromyko's suggestion, and in a further letter dated 4th August, 1971. These letters have not been answered nor even acknowledged.

Meanwhile inadmissible activities by Soviet officials in Britain have continued. During the last 12 months a number of Soviet officials

Soviet official establishment in Britain far outnumber the British officials working in the Soviet Union.

Her Majesty's Government have tolerated the growth of these establishments. They have not sought to bargain increases in the Soviet establishment in this country against increases in the British establishment in the U.S.S.R. nor have they sought to establish any fixed relationship between the Soviet commercial establishment in this country and the growth of British exports to the Soviet Union.

Evidence has, however, been accumulating that this tolerance has been systematically abused.

This abuse is a matter of serious concern to Her Majesty's Government as a direct threat to the security of this country. Moreover the recurring need to request the withdrawal of Soviet officials from this country or to refuse visas to certain officials selected for service in this country imposes strains on Anglo-Soviet relations.

So do unjustified acts of Soviet retaliation such as the recent expulsions of Mr Miller, Mr Nicholson and Mr Jackson.

Security contradiction

The Soviet Government can hardly fail to be conscious of the contradiction between their advocacy of a conference on European security and the scale of the operations against the security of this country which Soviet

Britain within two weeks from the date of this Aide-Memoire.

Henceforth:

- (i) the numbers of officials in the Soviet Embassy, (ii) the Soviet Trade Delegation, and (iii) all other Soviet organisations in Great Britain will not be permitted to rise above the levels at which they will stand after the withdrawal of the persons named in the attached list.

Reductions threat

- (b) If a Soviet official is required to leave the country as a result of his having been detected in intelligence activities, the permitted level in that category will be reduced by one.

The Soviet Embassy is also asked to take note that the Soviet citizens named on the second list attached, who are believed to have left the country but still hold valid re-entry visas, will not be permitted to return to Britain on account of their participation in intelligence activities.

Peterborough and Editorial Comment—P14

Russian firms in Britain

RUSSIAN organisations with offices in Britain include:

The MOSCOW NARODNY BANK, in King William Street, City, exists largely to finance East-West trade and money transfers, such as arise from the sale of gold.

It has been established in Britain for over 50 years and its assets are in the £350 million range. It employs English and Russian staff. It has shown a good profit from currency speculation.

INTOURIST is a Russian travel agency specialising in tours to the Soviet Union. It shares offices in Regent Street line with AEROFLOT, the Soviet airline.

TASS, the official Soviet news agency, has offices in

JACAR



THE DAILY TELEGRAPH

15 SEP 25 1971

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Kremlin Conflict: Diplomats vs. Spies

Perhaps the British were careless: expecting more trade and other contacts, they had let the official Soviet "community" in Britain build up in recent years to 550, larger than the Soviet "community" in the United States even including all Russians at the United Nations. A year ago the Foreign Office began privately warning the Kremlin that the scale of Soviet espionage (political, military, industrial) had gotten grossly out of hand—one out of two Soviets abroad is figured to be a KGB agent. But such was the arrogance of the Kremlin, or the power of the KGB within it, that the warnings were ignored. So over the weekend, in a long-welched decision apparently triggered by a Soviet agent's defection, the British expelled 105 suspected spies. To make sure Moscow got the message that spying must be kept within bounds, the Foreign Office said it must be satisfied on that count before it will support the conference on European security whose early convening is a major Soviet diplomatic goal. The United States apparently does not have a similar problem but it immediately offered the British its political support in handling theirs.

The result is to thrust upon the Soviet authorities a difficult choice and, probably, a tough internal battle as well. On one side are the diplomats, who want the security conference, and their Kremlin sponsors who believe that diplomacy and a moderate approach are the better ways to deal with the

West. On the other side are the KGB, which has a bureaucracy's vested interest in its own empire, and the KGB's political patrons, who take a narrow vigilant stance towards the West. The immediate answer to the Soviets' dilemma will be revealed by how Moscow follows through on its threat to retaliate—presumably by ousting members of the modest-sized British mission in Moscow. (For the Foreign Office to retract its expulsion decision, the only other alternative, is presumably unthinkable.) The more important answer to this fundamental conflict between "diplomats" and "spies" will necessarily be revealed only as overall Soviet policy unfolds.

Certainly, the British example—that is, the example of British laxity in earlier years—illustrates that the KGB has enough influence on Soviet policy to be able to exploit soft spots as they are found. In that limited sense, the "cold war" is still on. (We don't doubt that Western intelligence serv-

ices seek to exploit soft spots too. What we may now be able to see a bit more clearly, however, goes to a more relevant and more important question: whether the KGB and its vicious, dangerous and outmoded attitude to international relations can prevail when its activities are plainly embarrassing and harmful to legitimate Soviet national interests. There is no more important question in Soviet policy and Soviet politics today.

OLEG A. LYALIN

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Cleveland _____
Ponder _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

The Washington Post _____
Times Herald _____
The Washington Daily News _____
The Evening Star (Washington) _____
The Sunday Star (Washington) _____
Daily News (New York) _____
Sunday News (New York) _____
New York Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Daily World _____
The New Leader _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The National Observer _____
People's World _____

105-216642-H

NOT RECORDED

Date SEP 30 1971

156 MAR 16 1972

55 MAR 16 1972

105-216642

51 OCT 29 1971

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXPULSION LIST

Full Name:

Date of
Birth:

Date of
Arrival:

Overt Function:

--

b6
b7C
b7D

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6
b7C
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b6
b7C
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
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b6
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6
b7C
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 7 -

b6
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b7D

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

List of I.O.s who had
left the U.K.

Full Name:

Date of
Birth:

Date of
Arrival:

Overt Function:

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REC'D CIVIL RIGHTS
211 8/1/64

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIRECTOR, FBI (105-117821)

9/29/71

SAC, WFO (105-52159) (C)

[REDACTED]
(00:WFO)

File
ReBulet to WFO, 9/10/71, setting forth information furnished by [REDACTED] concerning captioned subject and the fact he told OLEG A. LYALIN, Soviet Defector, that while he was assigned to the Sovemb, WDC, 1963-1967, he had an agent offering him information about special classified cars.

A review of subject's file at WFO reveals the following information which was submitted to the Bureau under subject's caption, LHM form, 9/2/66.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] DC, [REDACTED] WFO, advised on 8/16/66 that [REDACTED] had been contacted on 8/12/66, by an individual later identified as [REDACTED] inquiring for [REDACTED] was on vacation [REDACTED] departed. Several hours later [REDACTED] reappeared at the office and told [REDACTED] he would like to obtain a list of automobile licenses and owners for the State of Virginia. [REDACTED] that such a list was not available and then asked [REDACTED] of his identity and who he represented. With this question, [REDACTED] became indignant and immediately departed the office.

Previously on 8/11/66, [REDACTED] was observed by an SA of WFO at the office of the R. L. Polk Company, Warner Building, 13th and E Streets, N.W., WDC. On this occasion [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] if a copy of the Fairfax City Directory was available. When [REDACTED] informed him a copy was not available, [REDACTED] asked if it was possible to obtain from R. L. Polk

③ - Bureau
① - 65-OLEG A. LYALIN)
1 - WFO

WB:rms

(4)

105-216642-
NOT RECORDED
44 OCT 4 1971

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ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-117821-195

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WFO 105-52159

a list of automobile licenses and owners for the State of Virginia. [] told him that such a list was not available and referred him to List Management and Marketing, 1130 17th Street, N.W., WDC.

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In 6/67 an SA of WFO purchased gas from an Esso Station, Piney Branch and Georgia Avenue, N.W., WDC. About one week later, the same SA again stopped at the Esso Station and the station manager, recognizing the SA approached him and recalled to the SA the previous time he was in the station. He stated that on that date, after the SA had left the station, a customer who had been having work performed on his car, approached the manager, stating that he thought he knew the individual in the car who just departed but could not recall his name and asked if he could look at the charge ticket. The station manager, without thinking more about the matter and stating the tickets were not confidential, handed the charge tickets to [] who flipped through them and noted carefully the ticket stamped "Fed Bur of Inv."

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The station manager informed he began thinking about the incident and believed the individual was Russian, but could not recall his name or license number of his car. He stated that because he believed the individual to be a Russian, he had mentioned the incident to the SA.

Contact was maintained with the service station manager after the incident and in 9/67, he advised that the individual did return to the station. He furnished the license number of the automobile registered to [] and identified a photograph of [] as being the person whom he had previously referred.

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The above two incidents are the only matters in [] file which might have some bearing on or relationship to the information furnished by LYALIN. No information was noted relative to "special classified cars."

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In this regard, [] advised on 9/21/71 that his office is an outlet in the WDC area for lists containing

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WFO 105-52159

automobile license numbers and owners. He stated that these lists are limited, however, inasmuch as all states do not allow these lists to be made available to individual companies or businesses. [] also noted that he had no knowledge of any "special" or "classified" lists of cars which are published.

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LYALIN stated that [] remarked that he had an agent "offering him information about special classified cars." It would seem that based on this statement, [] did not actually receive any information.

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During [] assignment in the United States, investigation revealed he utilized a Gulf Oil Company Credit Card and account. His appearance at the Esso Station referred to above, occurred just prior to his departure from the United States and at a time he was preparing his car for sale prior to his departure.

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WFO personnel utilize only one credit card, that being Esso and purchases are made at the numerous Esso stations located throughout the Metropolitan area of WDC, Maryland, and Virginia. It hardly seems plausible that one service station could provide [] with a list of cars or license numbers of cars belonging to the FBI or some other government agency in which the Soviets might have an interest.

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During the past years, information has been furnished to the WFO concerning the interest of the Soviets in developing a source at the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), presumably for the purpose of obtaining a list of FBI cars. WFO has not received any information that the Soviets have accomplished the above.

WFO recognizes the fact that the development of this type of source is possible and is alert to Soviet interest in this matter. Insofar as [] is concerned, with the exception of his contact with [] he was not known to have made contacts of this type.

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WFO 105-52159

In the absence of further information, additional investigation is not being conducted and this matter is being closed.

The Foreign Office aide
mémoire stated:

When Mr Gromyko visited London in October, 1970, he spoke of the desirability of improving Anglo-Soviet relations.

It is the sincere wish of her Majesty's Government to bring about such an improvement. There is however one matter of importance which has repeatedly caused friction in Anglo-Soviet relations. This is the scale of intelligence-gathering activities by Soviet officials in this country.

This subject was raised with Mr Gromyko by Sir Alec Douglas-Home, first in conversation in London and subsequently in a letter dated December 13, 1970, written at Mr Gromyko's suggestion, and in a further letter dated August 4, 1971.

These letters have not been answered, nor even acknowledged. Meanwhile inadmissible activities by Soviet officials in Britain have continued. During the last 12 months a number of Soviet officials have been required to leave the country after being detected in such activities. During the same period it has been decided not to issue visas to a number of officials nominated to Soviet establishments in the United Kingdom on account of their previous activities.

The staff of the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet trade delegation, which form the two largest elements in the Soviet official establishment in Britain, far outnumber the British officials working in the Soviet Union.

Her Majesty's Government have tolerated the growth of these establishments. They have not sought to bargain increases in the Soviet establishment in this country against increases in the British establishment in the USSR; nor have they sought to establish any fixed relationship between the Soviet commercial establishment in this country and the growth of British exports to the Soviet Union. Evidence has however been accumulating that this tolerance has been systematically abused.

This abuse is a matter of serious concern to her Majesty's Government as a direct threat to the security of this country. Moreover the continuing need to request the withdrawal of Soviet officials from this country, or to refuse visas to certain officials selected for service in this country, imposes strains on Anglo-Soviet relations. So do unofficial acts of Soviet retaliation

such as the recent expulsions of Mr Miller, Mr Nicholson and Mr Jackson.

The Soviet Government can hardly fail to be conscious of the contradiction between their advocacy of a conference on European security and the scale of the operations against the security of this country which Soviet officials and agents controlled by them have conducted.

Her Majesty's Government would like to see this contradiction resolved before the preparation of a conference on European Security begins.

The Soviet Embassy is therefore requested to arrange for the persons named on the attached list, all of whom have been concerned in intelligence activities, to leave Britain within two weeks from the date of this aide mémoire. Henceforth:

(a) The numbers of officials in (i) the Soviet Embassy (ii) the Soviet trade delegation, and (iii) all other Soviet organizations in Great Britain will not be permitted to rise above the levels at which they will stand after the withdrawal of the persons named in the attached list;

(b) If a Soviet official is required to leave the country as a result of his having been detected in intelligence activities, the permitted level in that category will be reduced by one.

The Soviet Embassy is also asked to take note that the Soviet citizens named on the second list attached, who are believed to have left the country but still hold valid reentry visas, will not be permitted to return to Britain, on account of their participation in intelligence activities.

In practice this means that out of a total strength of about 550 officials accredited to the various Soviet organizations in London, the British Government is asking for the withdrawal of about 90. It will not permit a further 15 or so, who have visas but are not in Britain, to come back. The total strength will therefore be reduced from about 550 to about 445.

A Foreign Office statement issued after Mr Ippolitov's call said also that the number of Soviet officials in Britain and the proportion of them engaged in intelligence work had been causing grave concern for some time. The size of the Soviet Embassy was limited in November, 1968, to its then number, about 80, after the case of Chief Technician Douglas Ronald Britten.

[He was sentenced in 1968 to 21 years' imprisonment for passing highly secret information to Soviet Intelligence. At the time of his arrest he was controlled by Mr A. I. Borisenko, Counsellor in the cultural department of the Soviet Embassy, who left for Moscow shortly after the arrest.]

The total number of Soviet officials filling posts in Britain, standing at 550, is higher than for any other Western country, including the United States.

105-216642-

ENCLOSURE

The Foreign Office statement said there was ample evidence of espionage activities. Further evidence of the scale and nature of Soviet espionage in Britain conducted under the auspices of the Embassy, trade delegations, and other organizations has been provided by a Soviet official who

recently applied for and was given permission to remain in Britain.

The man in question, an officer in the KGB (Soviet Intelligence) brought with him certain intelligence and documents, including plans for the infiltration of agents for the purpose of sabotage.

It was an open question last night whether the British Government's move would change Sir Alec Douglas-Home's plans to visit the Soviet Union. Earlier in the week he had received a message from Mr Gromyko proposing a date early in the new year.

Sir Alec was known then to feel that any final decision must await a talk with Mr Gromyko in New York. Sir Alec leaves today for a week at the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Russians, when faced with facts which can no longer be avoided, frequently respond. Although relations can hardly be anything but cool for the present, this forthright handling of a situation which had become intolerable may well clear the air and help to improve Anglo-Soviet relations in the end.

The influence of the Soviet Foreign Ministry is, however, by no means certainly sufficient to override the ambitions of the intelligence agencies in the Soviet Union.

Mr Yuri Andropov, the head of the KGB, for instance, is a member of the Soviet Council of Ministers and a candidate member of the Politburo, whereas Mr Gromyko, the Foreign Minister, is not in the Politburo at all.

The KGB has certainly been able to obtain a high proportion of the posts in Soviet missions abroad, particularly in those giving diplomatic immunity.

The large number of intelligence officers in the scientific and technical department of the Soviet Embassy shows the keen Russian interest in scientific and technical information in particular, including specifically information on electronics, transformers, semi-conductors, computer circuitry, and technical details of the Concorde and Olympus 593 engine.

Soviet representation in Britain has risen steadily from 138 in 1950 to 249 in 1960 and over 550 today (including working wives).

Since 1960 the British Government has requested the immediate recall of 27 Soviet officials detected in active espionage, and more than 40 visa applications by identified intelligence officers have been refused.

There are some 280 people connected with the Soviet Embassy and other official agencies who have diplomatic status, and their families, who do not have all the privileges but enjoy certain immunity.

Other Soviet personnel in Britain work for such concerns as the Aeroflot airline and the Moscow Narodny Bank.

Sir Alec's first letter to Mr Gromyko is dated December 3, 1970. It reads:

You will remember that on October 28, at the Soviet Embassy in London, I mentioned to you the case of F. D. Kudashkin. As you requested I have gone carefully into this case. F. D. Kudashkin's activities in the United States were referred to in court proceedings which were reported at length in the *New York Times* of March 9, 1965. I enclose a copy of that report.

If you will read it, you will certainly understand why my colleagues and I regard F. D. Kudashkin as unacceptable for any appointment in this country. I hope you will agree that in the interests of our relations it would be better that we should both regard the visa application made on his behalf as having lapsed.

The case of F. D. Kudashkin is by no means isolated and it is with regret that after the enjoyable and constructive discussions I had with you in London, I find myself constrained to write to you about the scale and nature of the intelligence activities conducted by Soviet

officials in this country and about the frequency of the attempts which have been made in recent months to introduce into this country officials who, in the past, have been engaged in such activities.

In 1970 alone we have refused visas to more than half a dozen Soviet officials assigned to this country because we have every reason to suspect, on the basis of what we know about their previous activities, that if they were admitted to this country they would not restrict themselves to work which we regard as legitimate and conducive to the maintenance and development of good relations.

Most of the men to whom we have refused visas had been appointed to the Soviet trade delegation. I know that the Soviet trade delegation is not directly subordinated to your Ministry, but since you, as Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, are concerned with all matters which affect the foreign relations of your country, I wish to invite your attention to the number of cases which have come to light of late in which members of the Soviet trade delegation have been found to have engaged in totally inadmissible activities. This year alone permission to stay in this country has had to be withdrawn from four members of the Soviet trade delegation. Since I had

occurred to speak to you about F. D. Kudashkin two new cases, one of them particularly serious, involving members of the Soviet trade delegation have been brought to my attention. And I am told that a visa application had recently been submitted for A. P. Saffonov, whom we know to have engaged in inadmissible activities when he worked at the Soviet trade delegation between 1962 and 1966.

The competent Soviet authorities will be able to give you full information about the various kinds of inadmissible activities which have been conducted from the Soviet trade delegation. They have included the running of agents, instruction in the use of clandestine techniques, the offer and payment of considerable sums of money to persons resident in this country, efforts to subvert them or secure their help in obtaining classified information (both official and commercial) or commodities subject to embargo or other restrictions.

You will be aware that Her Majesty's previous Government felt compelled to place a limit on the growth of the staff of the Soviet Embassy in 1968. Even so, since last August we have had to request the withdrawal of L. Y. Tyukhin and the attempt to appoint F. D. Kudashkin to the embassy has reawakened old suspicions.

When you were in London you said that Anglo-Soviet relations could not be described as bad, but that more could be done for their development and improvement. In this letter I have indicated a field which is becoming an increasing obstacle to the development of our relations and with regard to which the kind of improvement of which you spoke would be most welcome.

The representations which Sir Denis Greenhill made on this subject to Vice-Minister Kozyrev earlier this year appear from subsequent developments to have been ignored. I hope this personal letter to you will be handled in the spirit of your opening remarks to the Prime Minister and myself during your visit to London.

105-216642-

CLOSURE

to Dept.

DOM INTELL DIV.

OCT 7 3 41 PM '71

On August 4 this year Sir Alec wrote the following letter to Mr Gromyko:

I have received with interest Sir Denis Greenhill's reports of his conversations with Mr. Kozыrev and yourself in which you both referred to the allegedly hostile and provocative activities of the "British Special Services" against the Soviet Union and its citizens and against Soviet agencies in the UK, and in which you argued that these alleged activities did not contribute to the creation of a favourable atmosphere for the development of Anglo-Soviet relations. Since you have raised this matter I think it right to tell you that I see the situation in a very different light. The Soviet Union conducts espionage against Great Britain on a large scale. Even if I were to mention only those cases which have become public knowledge during the last few years, the list would be a long one. Many more cases, some of them very serious, are known to me and doubtless to you also. Governments which engage in intelligence activities on such a scale as this must expect that the authorities in the countries attacked will take such precautions and counter-measures as may be open to them. I do not accept your contention that, in the interests of Anglo-Soviet relations, HM Government should abstain from taking

measures to prevent, limit or inhibit the espionage conducted by Soviet officials and other Soviet citizens in this country on such an extensive scale. It is this which places a strain upon our relations. I take it that you yourself are fully informed of the scale of Soviet intelligence activities in this country. You are no doubt aware that the total number of Soviet officials on the staff of Soviet diplomatic, commercial and other organizations has now risen to more than 500 and you are presumably able to ascertain what proportion of these are intelligence officers. I would ask you to consider how this situation must appear to me, the Foreign Minister of the country against which all this activity is directed. I would add that the number of Soviet officials in the United Kingdom exceeds the number of Soviet officials in any comparable country and indeed even in the United States (excluding the UN). With the information at my disposal I find it hard to interpret the remarks made by Mr Kozыrev and yourself as other than a suggestion that HM Government should allow these intelligence agents of yours to conduct their activities in the United Kingdom unhampered lest Anglo-Soviet

relations should suffer. I consider this a proposition which it is unreasonable for any government to make to another, whatever the state of their relations.

As an example of the present situation I will mention one particular case. It is in no way exceptional but it happens to be the most recent. Last month HM embassy in Moscow received an application for a visa from a man named B. G. Glushchenko together with the statement that he had been nominated to the post of First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in London.

This man was in Britain from 1964 to 1968. At that time he was described as the representative of Avia Export at the Soviet trade delegation. Mr Glushchenko's activities, however, had little to do with the sale of aircraft. He came to our notice on various occasions. For example, he offered a large sum of money to a British businessman if he would obtain details of certain British military equipment.

This is the man whom some Soviet organization had nominated to serve as First Secretary at your embassy in London. He will hardly be surprised to learn that I am not prepared to permit such a person to return to this country.

I spoke to you on this subject during your visit to London in October, 1970. I did so in a manner which would have permitted the question to be pursued in a non-polemical way. You suggested that I should write you a letter and on December 3, 1970, I did so. To this date, to my surprise, I have received no reply, nor even an acknowledgement. Meanwhile, inadmissible Soviet activities in this country continue unabated. I ask you to reflect upon this and to consider the extent to which these activities are obstructing the development of Anglo-Soviet relations.

I note that Mr Kozыrev tried to obscure the central issue, namely, the scale and nature of your Government's intelligence activities in this country, by dragging the irrelevant question of a few Soviet citizens who at various times have sought and received permission to stay in this country, and by repeating a number of unwarranted accusations against the behaviour

of the British authorities. The accusations, which referred to past incidents, were dealt with at the time in separate exchanges.

As for the Soviet citizens, I again assure you that any Soviet citizen in this country who decides to return to the USSR is free to do so.

I trust that you will now feel able to reply to my original letter and to this one, which I send in the hope that you will say that you are ready immediately to terminate such activities.

ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-216642)

FROM : *JPM* SAC, NEW YORK (105-115626) (P)

SUBJECT: *O* OLEG A. LYALIN
IS - R

DATE: 10/13/71

See Bulet 11/20/71 - lines 10-12 get furnished info from []

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[] ReBulet to New York, dated 9/22/71, indicating that [] has offered to service any requests the FBI may have for questioning LYALIN and requesting the submission of questions that would be of interest to the Bureau. Reference is also made to WFO letter, dated 9/28/71, in this case.

Enclosed are three copies for the Bureau and one for WFO of blind memorandum, classified "Secret," in accordance with Bureau instructions, containing questions relating to matters of the Illegals Directorate, KGB.

It is suggested that the Bureau furnish the enclosed memorandum to Legat, London, for submission to [] It is noted that the questions have been mainly directed to specific problems concerned with the Illegals Directorate in view of LYALIN's two-year course in 1960 - 1961 in a clandestine training school for illegal agents, and his possible subsequent recontact with individuals whom LYALIN met during that training.

Questions have been set out under appropriate headings and although some may be duplicative by necessity with those previously submitted, it may aid LYALIN in recalling pertinent material.

- one file*
- ENCLOSURE**
- EX-109**
- 14*
- 3 - Bureau (Enc. 3) (RM)
 - (1 - Legat, London)
 - 1 - Washington Field (Enc. 1) (105-106153) (RM)
 - 1 - New York (65-17812) (341)
 - 1 - New York (65-19979) (341)
 - 1 - New York

JB:dpr
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60 OCT 28 1971



~~SECRET~~

DEFINITION OF ILLEGAL

Define what the KGB terms an Illegal. Give examples of various types mentioned.

TRAINING SCHOOL FOR ILLEGAL AGENTS

Identify and describe individuals who were in training school with you as both students and teachers.

Describe training in selection of drops, meeting places, secret writing techniques, anti-surveillance procedures, communication methods, etc.

PROCEDURES/ORGANIZATION

Are third-country nationals used by Soviets in illegal networks in target country?

To what extent are Soviet nationals used as illegal agents in target country?

Are business concerns in target country ever used as part of illegal network?

Where are illegal agents placed in United States? What are principal targets in the United States?

How many illegal agents would the Soviet Union send to the United States?

Has the number of Illegal Support officers serving abroad increased or decreased in recent years?

Has the Center taken over the day-to-day direction of illegals so that the duties of Illegal Support officers abroad have been minimized?

How long would an illegal agent reside in target country before he becomes operational? Does this procedure vary with different target countries?

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

105-216642-14

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PROCEDURES/ORGANIZATION (cont'd)

How many illegal agents does one Illegal Support officer handle?

Can an illegal agent and his wife enter target country with children?

Do Illegal Support officers and their assigned illegal agents have personal meetings in target country?

What South American countries are utilized to send agents into the United States?

Are Americans recruited in the United States for use as agents in other countries? On large scale?

RETURN TO SOVIET UNION OF ILLEGAL AGENTS

How long would an illegal agent remain out of target country on such a trip?

Is there any pre-set time schedule for illegals to return to USSR for briefing; i.e., 2, 3, etc. years?

How long would an illegal agent remain in target country before returning to the Soviet Union for vacation? For permanent recall? For briefing?

ESCAPE/RECALL FROM TARGET COUNTRY

What type of escape training and documentation is given to illegals to leave target country if they believe they are compromised?

In the event that KGB recalled illegal agents from target country in belief their cover had been blown, and it was later concluded this was not true, would KGB send these same illegals back to that country?

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~~SECRET~~

FINANCIAL

Is Swiss bank being utilized in funding of illegal agents in the United States?

What is the usual method for funding of illegals in target country?

COMMUNICATIONS

Method of communication between Center and illegal agent in target country?

Method of communication between support officer and illegal agent?

Are commercial radios adaptable for target country used by Illegal Support officer to communicate with illegal agents in target country?

What make radio does Center recommend for the use of its illegal agents in target country?

In illegal training school, where is it recommended that illegal agents hide radio schedules, secret writing equipment, etc., when they have set up residence in target country?

Does an Illegal Support officer monitor at one of the legal establishments the same radio transmissions that the illegal agent (whom he operates) receives?

USE OF CP MEMBERS IN ILLEGAL APPARATUS

Are children of old CP members in any way recruited?

What is current policy re involvement of CP members in target countries in illegal apparatus, support or recruitment?

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USE OF POST OFFICE AND SAFE DEPOSIT BOXES

Are safe deposit boxes used by illegal agents
in target country?

Are Post Office boxes used by illegal agents
in target country?

SABOTAGE/DISRUPTION UNITS

In the event of crisis preceding outbreak of
conventional war, what action do you think illegal groups
took in the United States during the Cuban crisis in 1962?

Are any sabotage units now operational in the
United States?

If so, describe organization, equipment, number
of agents, procedures, targets.

Are any disruptive units used at this time by
Soviets in the United States?

If so, describe organization, procedures, number
of agents, targets.

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16
SUBJECT: OLEG LYALIN
CHARACTER: IS - R
BUFILE: 105-216642
NYFILE: 105-115626
WFOFILE:

my list
OCT 15 1971

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

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IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE
SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

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CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
~~GROUP 1~~

The Bureau advised on 9/28/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

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New York

Bureau

1 - [REDACTED] - 105-71932
1 - [REDACTED] - 105-40818
1 - 105-112777 (SAN FRANCISCO 2 - 105-210032
SOVIET CONSUL)
1 - New York (2) - 105-216642

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DOWNGRADED TO

SECRET

Per ca28w34864
Date 11/4/2014

105-216642 -
NOT RECORDED
170 OCT 26 1971

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5-9-71

NY 105-115626

It has been previously reported that [redacted] was [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] KGB Residency in late fall of 1971. In addition, it has been reported that [redacted]
[redacted] also in the late fall of 1971.

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On 9/28/71, the source advised that [redacted] will undoubtedly not be sent to Great Britain, a fact not only dictated by KGB Headquarters, but likewise in keeping with the British refusal to permit any Soviets to assume the positions of those Soviets expelled as a result of the OLEG LYALIN defection. The source also noted that, since [redacted] is known to LYALIN, it is felt by the source that [redacted] likewise [redacted]
[redacted]

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On 9/28/71, [redacted] LYALIN [redacted] stated that on the basis of disruption caused by the LYALIN defection, especially upon those KGB officers abroad who are possibly known to LYALIN, [redacted] personally feels that it is much safer to be assigned to KGB Headquarters at this time.

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SUBJECT:
CHARACTER:
BUFILE:
NYFILE:
WFOFILE:



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OCT 15 1971

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IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

b7D

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE
SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

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CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
~~GROUP 1~~

The Bureau advised on 9/28/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

b7D

New York

1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - 105-115626 (LYALIN)
1 - New York

Bureau

2 - 105-156252
2 - 105-204757
2 - 105-156261
2 - 105-131411
2 - 105-216642
2 - 105-194027

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DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per C28W34B64

Date 11/11/2014

NOT RECORDED
170 OCT 26 1971

57 NOV 1 1971

NY 105-104546

A repeat performance of the Princeton operation
was scheduled for Monday evening, 9/27/71. This operation

[redacted]
[redacted] rather than [redacted]

[redacted] NJ. However, in view of the LYALIN defection,
and the Moscow prohibition concerning meets or situations
which might be potentially embarrassing to the KGB, [redacted]

[redacted]

Accordingly, [redacted]
the day of 9/27/71 [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]

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SUBJECT:
CHARACTER:
BUFILE:
NYFILE:
WFOFILE:



nglet
OCT 15 1971

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IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

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IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE
SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

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25
CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
~~GROUP 1~~

The Bureau advised on 9/28/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

b7D

New York

Bureau

12
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - 105-115626 (LYALIN)
1 - New York

2 - 105-186630
2 - 65-74039
② - 105-216642
2 - 105-174923

b6
b7C

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per C28039804
Date 11/12/04

105-216642
NOTED
170 OCT 26 1971

4374
57 NOV 1 1971

5- [Signature]

[redacted]

b7D

It has been previously reported that [redacted]

b6
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[redacted]
first name OLEG, who is employed in the Space Department of
ITT, Nutley, NJ. [redacted] was of the opinion that,
after two or three additional meetings with OLEG, he (OLEG)
would agree to cooperate with [redacted] in behalf of
the KGB.

On 9/28/71 the source advised, with reference
to the above, that [redacted] has met with OLEG recently
but apparently the results were not too favorable. [redacted]

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[redacted]

In discussing [redacted]
his personal opinion that [redacted]

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[redacted]

NY 105-85753

The OLEG LYALIN defection will undoubtedly influence the nature of [redacted] next assignment within KGB Headquarters, Moscow. Although 105 are returning, 85 of whom may possibly be Soviet intelligence personnel, only 15 of this number were [redacted] in Moscow. As a result, it will be a [redacted] sufficient number of assignments available within the Directorate when [redacted] returns to Moscow in late December, 1971, to suitably accommodate him.

b6
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14
SUBJECT: OLEG LYALIN
CHARACTER: IS - R
BUFILE: 105-216642
NYFILE: 105-115626
WFOFILE:

ny let
OCT 15 1971

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

b7D

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE
SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

b7D

CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
~~GROUP 1~~

The Bureau advised on 9/28/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

b7D

New York

1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - New York

Bureau

2 - 105-37364
2 - 105-
② - 105-216642

b6
b7C

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per C28W34B6V

Date 4/4/2014

105-216642-
NOT RECORDED
170 OCT 26 1971

57 NOV 1 1971

5 J. B. Lee

NY 105-115626

Recently, in conversation [redacted]
[redacted] indicated that he
had been expecting the new Chief [redacted]
[redacted] to arrive in the US but, to date, no
information has been received from Moscow relative to this
arrival. [redacted] stated that he does not know whether
LYALIN's defection has had any effect in this matter.

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b7D

SUBJECT:
CHARACTER:
BUFILE:
NYFILE:
WFOFILE:



NY let
OCT 14 1971 b7D

56
IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE
SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~
~~GROUP 1~~

The Bureau advised on 9/28/71 of the receipt
of the following information from [REDACTED]

New York

1 - 105-115626 (LYALIN)

1 - [REDACTED]

1 - [REDACTED]

1 - [REDACTED]

NEW YORK

Bureau

2 - 105-LYALIN

2 - 65-57773

2 - 65-57772

105-216642 -
NOT RECORDED
170 OCT 21 1971

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per C28W33B64

Date 11/12/74

60 NOV 1 1971 105-216642

[REDACTED]

Source has determined that, as of 9/23/71, all intelligence meetings between KGB officers and their more important American agents have been canceled. This action was taken by KGB Headquarters, Moscow, in view of the recent defection of OLEG LYALIN in Great Britain.

At this time, source was unable to offer any further information regarding the duration of this action.

~~SECRET~~

FBI

Date: 10/14/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74228)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (65-25699)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

(OO:NY)
6S

CLASS. BY

G-3

DATE OF REVIEW

QADR

11/23/82

ReBuairtel to Boston, dated 10/5/71, captioned

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

⑦-Bureau

[REDACTED]
105-216642-2 (VALIN)

(1-65-67020 ILLEGAL SUPPORT SECTION)
(1-105-213721)

2-Boston (65-5256)

[REDACTED]
1-New York (105-115626 LYALIN)

[REDACTED]
1-New York (65-19979 ILLEGAL SUPPORT SECTION)

[REDACTED]
1-New York

JRH:lw
(15)

105-216642-
NOT RECORDED
98 OCT 22 1971

CARBON COPY

also downgraded to pg. 2
pg. 1/29/15

~~SECRET~~

Approved: [Signature] Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

~~SECRET~~

NY 65-25699

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST". IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE
SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

CLASSIFICATION:

~~"TOP SECRET"~~ GROUP 1

The Bureau advised on 10/8/71 of the then recent
receipt of the following information from [REDACTED]

Recently [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

This unknown agent is now in the United States,
having arrived several months ago, but his present location
and employment in the US are unknown. [REDACTED]

Reportedly, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] England, and his identity should be
known to OLEG LYALIN, who recently defected from the KGB
Residency in London, England. It is felt by the reporting
source [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
several months in view of LYALIN's defection.

The reporting source was unable to furnish any
additional information in this matter.

~~SECRET~~

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b7D

b6
b7C
b7D
b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

~~SECRET~~

NY 65-25699

It would appear from the above that the unknown agent referred to by [redacted] is in all probability identical with [redacted] in view of this, this information is being furnished to the Boston Office to aid in their interview of [redacted]

b6
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b7D

(U) ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

SAC, WFO (105-106153)

10/20/71

Director, FBI (105-216642) - 15

1 - Mr. Lee

OLEG A. LYALIN
ESP - R

Reurlet 9/28/71.

A careful review has been made of the questions set out in relet to be asked of Lyalin and it is felt that some of these questions are of such a nature that they presume the subject has knowledge which he does not have. For example, these questions presume that Lyalin has knowledge of Soviet illegal operations; however, the history which he has furnished to the British does not indicate that he has such knowledge. The Bureau will not forward these questions to [] for the purpose of interrogating the subject at this time. When we have received more information from [] concerning the extent of the subject's cooperation and the areas of knowledge which he has, these questions will be re-examined and used as a basis for further questioning of Lyalin by []

b7D


- 1 - New York
- 1 - Boston
- 1 - San Francisco

JPL:tdp (7)

NOTE:

NY and WFO were told by Bulet 9/22/71 that [] had indicated it would service any request the FBI might have for questioning the subject. WFO prepared a series of questions for presentation to Lyalin, the Soviet defector currently in England. It is believed that the questions as set up by WFO are too revealing and should be carefully reviewed after we have determined the full nature of Lyalin's operations for the KGB and the extent of his cooperation.

b7D



Tolson _____
Felt _____
Rosen _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Cleveland _____
Ponder _____
Bates _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soy _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM [] TELETYPE UNIT []

APL
JFL

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 9/28/71

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-106153) (P)

SUBJECT: OLEG A. LYALIN
IS - R

ReBulet to New York, 9/22/71, indicating [] has offered to service any requests the FBI may have for questioning subject and requesting recipient offices to submit any questions it feels would be of interest to the Bureau.

b7D

Enclosed are 3 copies for Bureau and 1 each for Boston, San Francisco and New York of blank memo classified "~~Secret~~" containing questions regarding individuals reportedly connected with Illegals Directorate, KGB and with matters related to the Illegals Directorate. Also attached for Bureau are photographs of 30 individuals, keyed numerically to names also attached. Also enclosed are 3 copies for Bureau and 1 each for Boston, San Francisco and New York of blank memo classified "~~Secret~~" pertaining to cases furnished by [] which might relate to the Illegals Directorate and Department #13, First Chief Directorate. In addition there are enclosed 3 copies for Bureau and 1 each for Boston, San Francisco and New York of memo containing questions of a general nature regarding the identification of Illegals Directorate agents.

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The memos pertaining to individuals and cases are based on information furnished by [] although he is not referred to as the source therein. They have been classified "~~Secret~~" since [] has requested that information from [] be so classified. The memo pertaining to individuals also contain questions concerning []

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b7E

ENCLOSURE

ENC. BEHIND FILE

- 2 - Bureau (Enc. 13)
- (1 - Legat, London)
- 1 - Boston (Enc. 3)
- 1 - New York (Enc. 3)
- 1 - San Francisco (Enc. 3)
- 1 - WFO

JPH:jw
(7)

REC-26 105-216642-15

20 OCT 20 1971

ESPIONAGE



WFO 105-106153

It is suggested that the Bureau furnish the enclosed memoranda to Legat, London for submission to [redacted]

b7D

After an analysis has been made of the information furnished by subject concerning his knowledge of KGB operations and/or personalities, additional questions may be prepared for discussion by [redacted] with subject. WFO is considering the possibility of submitting to Legat, London photographs and names, based on identifications by [redacted] of officers of the First Chief Directorate and Second Chief Directorate, KGB, to be used in interviews of subject by [redacted]

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b7D

WFO will submit by separate communication comments concerning the information enclosed in reBulet 9/22/71 which was furnished by subject about his knowledge of KGB operations in the United States.

~~SECRET~~ (U)

1 - Mr. Lee

1 - [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

October 18, 1971

16368

REC-60

RE: OLEG A. LYALIN

EX-103

Reference is made to your communication dated September 8, 1971, reporting information obtained from captioned subject relating to Soviet intelligence operations in the United States.

[REDACTED]

b1
b3
(S)

In order that we may be more positive in our identification of this individual, when circumstances permit, we would appreciate your asking captioned subject the following questions concerning this operation:

- (1) When and under what circumstances did he learn the above information?
- (2) At the time he learned it was anyone else present other than the individual from whom he obtained the information?
- (3) Can he recall any additional facts such as [REDACTED] ethnic origin? [REDACTED]

(S)

- (5) Does he have any other information which might assist in the identification of this individual?

1 - Legat, London

105-216642

1 - Special Coordination Unit
(Route thru for review)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Delivered to Washington representative of [REDACTED] by [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ (U)

on 10-19-71

b1
b3
b7D

JEN:cgc

(9)

51 OCT 28 1971

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

B.F.R.
JEN

~~SECRET~~ (U)

RE: OLEG A. LYALIN

NOTE:

(S) Classified "Secret" as it reveals information

[redacted] the unauthorized disclosure of which could cause serious damage to the defense interests of the U.S. b1 b3

(S) Analysis of information furnished by Lyalin [redacted] b1 b3

(S) U.S. Army [redacted] b1 b3

[redacted] requested additional inquiries be made of Lyalin to confirm identification and such inquiries are also logical [redacted] (S)

[redacted] by Lyalin's defection. (S) These inquiries would also be the logical investigative step [redacted]

Army's questions 1 and 2 are combined in our question 1; Army's question 4 is our question 2; Army's questions 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10 are combined in our questions 3 and 4. Regarding Army's question 11, [redacted] has already furnished information concerning other U.S. Military personnel recruited by Soviets. Regarding Army's question 13, [redacted] has already furnished a statement on Lyalin's reliability. Army's question 12 is our question 5. b7D

U.S. Army is not aware that Bureau has advised [redacted] therefore, they have posed specific questions. [redacted] answers to our questions will provide sufficient basis for our reply to U.S. Army. b1 b3 b7D

~~SECRET~~ (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 - Mr. Lee

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: October 19, 1971

To: Director
Office of Investigations and Security
Room 5037
Main Commerce Building
Washington, D. C. 20230

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: ~~SOVIET REQUIREMENTS~~

REC-46

EX-102

Reference is made to your letter dated October 8, 1971, your reference 848: 2-74 FBI.

Your letter made inquiry about embargoed goods sought by the Soviets mentioned in an article which appeared in "Time Magazine" for October 11, 1971. Since this article dealt with Soviet espionage in Great Britain, efforts will be made to identify the case through foreign sources and you will be furnished with the results of this inquiry.

JPLtdp (4)

NOT:

Dept. of Commerce noted that an article appeared in "Time Magazine" for 10/11/71 containing a reference to embargoed merchandise that the Soviets attempted to obtain. This article dealt with Soviet espionage operations in Great Britain. A separate communication is being directed to [] to identify the particular items. This is classified "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~" since it refers to information so classified by Dept. of Commerce.

BY COURIER SVC.

33 OCT 20

FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CT 28 1971

TELETYPE UNIT

b7D